Your articles are generally very informative and a pleasure to read, but you seem to be a bit short on the strategic details on this one, if all the other hot takes are any indication of the state of play.
Particularly the potential for this war to have a very wide range of international ramifications on nations like India and Japan and other middle powers like Türkei.
Also, the aggressors have low stockpiles of missiles and interceptors, apparently, and this will severely limit the ability for sustained conflict longer than about a month, maximum, if other commentators are correct.
I have even heard US strategic bloggers saying this could turn out to be one of the worst decisions for the Israeli US exceptionalists ever. As there is no credible off-ramp, or any reason why Iran should not fire everything they have at their enemy, and that considering the vast numbers of missiles and drones stock piled by Iran, Israel could be crippled by striking desal plants and energy platforms just off the coast. Plus many more scenarios.
Perhaps you can skim "Collapse Intelligence Agency"s substack article for an incredible piece, of details and potential problems.
As for what will happen, time will tell.
Really appreciate your articles, all the same.
Even your pro-AI stuff is a good contrast against the gloomy AI stuff.
Yes, the ramifications are indeed farther-reaching. The three countries you mention are examples. I decided against adding that because I think the impact of these potential ramifications is dwarfed by the unknowns within the region.
I did mention the stockpiles, but I decided against saying anybody is short on anything, because that information is classified, so any claims of one side or the other falling short is misinformation. We will only be able to compare stockpiles as the war actually unfolds.
I think the off-ramp take from these strategic bloggers misses the point. Israel knows there is no off-ramp with Iran; there never was. As Iran exists for the purpose of eliminating Israel, there can only be two outcomes: Iran's regime falls, or Israel disappears. The 12-day war was not a war, it was a battle. The war between Iran and Israel started in 1979.
Thanks for your kind words and criticisms nonetheless!
I wish I could share your optimism with regards Iran's future Tomas, but I fear a protracted civil war or military coup seems the most likely outcome, as neither Trump nor Netanyahu cares about the Iranian people's freedom or prosperity and have made zero plans for it. Also, Trump did not succeed in regime change in Venezuela. He removed Maduro and his wife only; the regime is still otherwise entirely intact! A fact the Venezuelans are painfully aware of. Nothing Trump has ever done or will ever do will advance democracy or freedom for anyone.
The Venezuelan regime is mostly intact, but much more amenable to the US! That was the genius of it.
A military coup in Iran might be better than continuing the current regime—after all, most Gulf countries are kingdoms, and they're more amenable to Western interests and better managed internally.
Civil war would be terrible for Iranians, but I don't know how bad they would be for the West. Syria turned out well for the West. Libya is not a threat.
Appreciate the reply, but I beg to differ. If the Venezuelan regime is more amenable, it's certainly not through choice. I'm not convinced any of the charges against Maduro will even hold up in court. As for the oil Trump plans to steal, it cannot be exploited without massive investment over the years. Anything but genius.
I agree that a coup in Iran might be better for the Iranians than the current hideous regime's survival or a civil war, but the potential for another refugee crisis could destabilise the entire region and the West.
Trump's abduction of Maduro, like his war on Iran, is totally illegal. He had no UN or congressional approval for either. Not that he cares, of course, but his actions have serious ramifications for the rest of us with the abandonment of the rules-based order and a return to the law of the jungle.
I suspect both decisions were made to detract from his own increasing domestic woes and for personal enrichment, with little or no thought given to the consequences.
The biggest threat to the West and indeed the world order is Trump's criminally corrupt and belligerent presidency!
But don't you agree that people may be concerned or alarmed by something/someone without "hating" it/them?
And don't you think that senior US officials like the president should tell the world what their administration knows (on climate change, Chinese wind power, Epstein, tariffs, Putin etc.) - rather than what that senior official considers their personal interest?
Why did the majorities in both houses of the US "co-equal branch of government" abrogate their duty to exercise oversight over the executive?
A big fan of your articles and your analysis. I don't entirely agree with this conclusion though. It's not clear to me that regime change is the specific outcome US is seeking. I think it's considered a risky bonus but not a base case.
- A denuclearized or significantly less nuclear-capable Iran is the first priority, both for US and Israel. This is not just regarding Iran, but further non-proliferation in the region. Saudi Arabia has said if Iran gets the bomb, they will also pursue. Probably Turkiye has same view. So allowing Iran to get a bomb has negative dominos besides Iran. (And this really stems from North Korea as the key example, i.e. if I have a nuke they won't mess with me, and Libya as the counter-example, I gave up nukes and it didn't save me.)
- Whether Iran was close to a nuke or not, Israel had a specific window of opportunity that was closing. Israel had already degraded Iranian proxies (Hezbollah), which are usually the first obstacle. And Israel has already consumed credibility globally for Gaza. So for attacking Iran, it had little to lose, because a nuclear Iran remains existential to it. Finally, the US has a president who is amenable to Israel, and is clearly comfortable with exercising military force. But that window is finite. So Israel has strong incentive to try to act now, whether nukes are imminent in Iran.
- US under this Administration has shown comfort (per Venezuela) with no true regime change, but a pseudo-client state kind of playbook. Take out Maduro, get Rodriguez to bow the knee, indifferent to Machado or actual democratic reform in Venezuela. The US doesn't need regime change as a primary outcome. So I don't entirely agree with a view that a change in regime to a democratic Iran is really a priority here.
- I don't think Iran (whomever is in charge) is necessarily stupid for hitting other Gulf countries. Threatening regional oil infra is the ONLY move. Iran cannot hurt Israel or US militarily. What can it do? It can hit the global economy. Straits of Hormuz, natural gas, refineries. Notably, Iran has not mined the Straits of Hormuz, only threatened to hit tankers, so this is leverage that can be walked back. It also has not gone all out to destroy all facilities of other Gulf states; and casualties are quite limited. Every day the oil/nat gas doesn't flow is a day that China and Europe feel pressure. Russia alone is happy for this state of war to continue. I think threatening the infrastructure here (and demonstrating the ability to hit it) is to get more folks (including Gulf states and Europe) to pressure US as leverage in the coming negotiation. Attacking Qatar with ballistic missiles and 2 aircraft is admittedly puzzling, but using 2 cheap drones to cause limited damage (not irreparable) to a crucial LNG facility is smart, because it demonstrates even when they are out of ballistic missiles, they still have cheap assets that can cause hydrocarbons to grind to a halt. (I don't think of Qatar as being an ally of Iran so much as the Switzerland of the region. It has housed both Hamas' political arm and CENTCOM at the same time.)
- If you are IRGC or remnants of the Ayatollah's beyt, you are playing for regime continuance, but with as much leverage as you can.
- For US, regime change is a bonus but not a base case. A significantly weakened Iran still under this regime is a win, and extracting more de-nuclearization steps is a win. If an uprising occurs, consider it as a risky bonus situation. A civil war, where the US selectively bombs the folks it doesn't want to win, seems very high risk. Israel has a very clean win with weakening and de-nuclearization, and a democratically elected Iran isn't necessarily a positive for Israel. But Israel had a specific window of opportunity that was closing. (Also why Hezbollah getting hit now, and why Syrian military bases were bombed when Assad fell--the strategic cost for these actions is near zero while degrading assets that can hurt Israel.)
- Importantly, note that for the Gulf region countries, a weakened Iran under authoritarian rule is the BEST case. Because a democratized Iran is actually a far worse case, for Gulf monarchies. So GCC base support of genuine regime change via ground invasion was never on the table, in my opinion.
- So currently this is about accruing leverage and providing face-saving or credibility-building actions in pursuit of the smart bet--a negotiated ceasefire which keeps the regime (maybe under IRGC) but extracts more de-nuclear steps, while hoping complete tail risks don't get out of control (e.g. can't walk back hardliners, large numbers of population killed in Gulf states or US servicepeople, near irrevocable damage to oil infrastructure, civil war in Iran). To me, lightly hitting the Gulf infrastructure on oil/gas and threatening tankers shows that there IS an off-ramp. Given a few weeks of paralyzed infrastructure, the pressure from Europe and China to get both sides to come to the table becomes REALLY strong. Because the spice must flow. And importantly, Russia is incentivized to keep the fighting on-going. So I wouldn't be surprised if Iran's hardest hardliners get more Russian aid/assistance regarding drones, based on battlefield experience in Ukraine.
This is entirely my speculation, but I've just tried to game it out as clearly as I can with realpolitik. There is plenty I don't know though, so there could be regional dynamics I have gotten completely wrong, would like to receive any critiques on mistaken assumptions here.
• I think regime change is mandatory for the US and Israel, else we're just back a few years and there's not guarantee that the next US gov will be as forthcoming. Because it's not just the nuclear threat. It's the underlying promise to kill the US / Israel.
• Weakened Iran is better than powerful democratic Iran for GCC... maybe. Unclear. Better for them if it became a monarchy, but the current version was too hostile.
• As you've seen, the US can get the spice to flow (see Trump's insurance guarantee on shipments)
What US values are you talking about? In 1953 CIA along with MI6 orchestrated a coup that dismantled the democratically elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Code-named "Operation Ajax" (or TP-Ajax), the US-backed covert operation was designed to overthrow Mosaddegh after he nationalized the Iranian oil industry, which had previously been under British control. Following the successful overthrow, the CIA helped consolidate power around Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, who became a close U.S. ally for the next 25 years. Shah’s despotic rule, sustained by brutal repression, and the corruption that accompanied his modernizing program contributed directly to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
The day after in Iran is death, havoc, destruction, same as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria. One quote from Eric Maria Remarque - when we bomb a city, this is strategic necessity, when others do it, it is a crime.
Good analysis overall as always, but it is worth mentioning at the beginning that, based on all that I have read regarding the history, the Shah's regime though aligned with the West was deeply unpopular in Iran (not to mention it came to power from an M16/CIA backed coup against a formerly democratic government) which allowed the 1979 revolution to occur in the first place.
EDIT: realized you did mention this in an earlier piece which you linked but I did not read yet when I posted (relatively new subscriber!)
An interesting though experiment could be if the Shah's regime, if it had survived, would have turned into a version of China (authoritarian but ultimately cares about and is driven by its economy and growth), but history is what it is.
- Internet is down ==> how to coordinate effectively?
- Even if some manage to some area or prisoners and occupy the local police station - how do they know that the US/Israel bombers know and won't bomb them?
Thank you for the great article, as always. I feel you missed the fact that Russia will likely benefit from this war (and the Venezuela situation) not only through higher oil prices, but also by replacing both countries in China’s oil import mix: higher oil prices and increased in direct sales to China, reducing its reliance on the shadowy black fleet, which could also increase also increase Russia’s margin.
The big "if" is in your last sentence "But only if the current regime falls". This is wishful thinking. There has been no historical case of regime change through air power. Without boots on the ground from the US, it will be nearly impossible to impose a 'democratic' or pro western regime. The best they can hope for is a more pragmatic leadership, and the worst, a Libyia type scenario with a continuation of a humbled Islamic Republic is, in my opinion, the most likely.
And escalating the war in the Gulf is a desperate, but rational, move by the Islamic Republic, hoping to create a world disruption and inflation that the US cannot withstand for a long time, as very few of its citizens see the point of this war.
Civil war is not just "perilously possible." It has been going on since the end of last year (if not before). It is an almost unimaginably asymmetrical war: millions of unarmed Iranian citizens against a heavily-armed regime. I truly cannot imagine the bravery, or desperation, of the millions of Iranians who have taken to the streets even after tens of thousands of their fellow citizens have been slaughtered by their own government.
Nothing has changed in Venezuela, apart from USA stealing its Oil, but then that’s all USA wanted, oh! apart from access to its mineral wealth. Thing is Venezuela is controlled by the cartels, whilst they may let companies enter to expand their Oil and mineral sector, once the investment from production becomes profitable they’ll take control again just like they have in the past. Now what’s the saying, oh yes, “Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice shame on me, just ask the fools at ExxonMobil🤔
If you hadn’t included China I’d have said maybe, but as you did it’s a fantasy, and being a fantasy ignoring China, Russia and Iran it could very well turn into a nightmare, and realistically Tomas, WWIII. Why! Well check out Jiang’s video. But first: A flashback to May 2024, before the U.S. elections even kicked off. This Beijing-based historian named Jiang Xueqin dropped THREE predictions that sounded completely unhinged at the time, two have already happened👇
1. DonaldTrump wins the 2024 election.
2. The United States goes to war with Iran .
3. The U.S. LOSES this Iran War and it permanently reshapes the global order of GeoPolitics.
And just how might America not win this War, well check out:
YouTube— “America Started a War They Can't Win | Prof Jiang Explains”
Be afraid, be very afraid, like Nuclear afraid for all of us😦🤔
Excellent summary, thank you for sharing this. It's so difficult to find a clear headed assessment of the situation, even from supposed news organizations.
Just three comments: 1) Iran is bombing neighbors in order to make chaos(oil markets, safety for rich, trying to push leaders of those countries asking USA to stop this), I think there could be more analysis on that. 2) There is a licensed shahed drones production in russia already for a while. They probably don't need iranian help that much, on the opposite - Iran is buying weaponry from Russia. 3) China is not an ally to anyone except China, and with your experience in writing about geography and geopolitics, you should probably know that more than many of us.
Good article, but important thing to note is that the IRGC cannot operate outside of the "Velayat-e Faqih" (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) structure. It is not a professional force capable of governing, nor does it have much independent agency. Rather, it is an ideological militia that already controls the country and many of its economic resources. The IRGC is already at the top and does not need to stage a coup against itself.
Great article Tomas... I am generally pessimistic when bombs are flying, but the Iranian people are a unique asset...higly educated, clearly wishing for freedom, and now the door has been opened. The fact they do not have an independent way to defend themselves short of American/Israeli support is a big hole to fill.
The IRGC and the tiered Iranian military either lays down their arms for immunity or they remain defiant. I don't know the answer, but now add that Iran has made all their neighbors enemies, they have committed an absurb act of hari kari. This act of war against their only friends in the region has rarely been seen in modern warfare.
I still believe the time had come to disable this regime. Diplomacy was never in their vocabulary. In the end, although not yet clear in the fog of war, I still strongly support and believe we will help to create a new, freer Iran.
"China had collected anti-US friends in Russia, Iran and its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Hamas and the Houthis, Venezuela, Cuba, and a host of satellites considering whether to join them or not"
This kind of statement requires a lot more careful phrasing, to what actual extent really is China a friend/ally of Russia, Iran or Venezuela? Such that attacking those countries is rolling back their strategic influence, as opposed to striking their trade partners?
"If China won’t come to the rescue of its allies, and its weapons can’t stop the US, who will want to side with them?"
Doesn't this sentence immediately contradict the content of the above one? To what extent, really, was Iran using CHinese weapons, such that we would say they are "on their side?" If they aren't "coming to their rescue" and in fact isn't even weighing whether or not to do so, then how were they even remotely military friends or allies in the first place rather than just trading partners with no other commitments?
Putting these statements next to each other is really weird. The relationship between say, Iran and Hezbollah is not similar to China : Iran. Iran's govt can be bad. Hezbollah and Hamas can be bad. China's govt can be bad too, but this is just taking propaganda at face value. They can be separately bad, not everything has to be a global Axis of Evil, and you might indeed find it easier to prevent evil in one quarter by not necessarily linking it to evil in another. If you have decided that a regime is a threat, attacking their oil suppliers makes them more likely to increase the threat to you.
Below are specific agreements to back the friendship between the countries I mentioned, from Grok. The collaboration was not just economic. It was in security, military armament, and military coordination. On the weapons side, Iran recently bought notably Chinese defensive systems: HQ-16, HQ-17AE, HQ-9B, and YLC-8B. China was short of a mutual-defense pact with any of these countries because it's not stupid. It doesn't want to get mired in a foreign war. But these agreements were more and more comprehensive over time. Let them continue, and they could only strengthen.
There are many bad governments that are not part of this alliance, eg: Afghanistan, Burma (although they are getting closer to China), Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Sudan... I am calling out the ones that were getting closer to China.
Russia:
- Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era (2019): Deepens coordination across politics, economy, security, and international affairs.
- "No Limits" Partnership Joint Statement (February 2022): Declares friendship with "no limits" and "no forbidden areas of cooperation," opposing U.S.-led alliances and color revolutions; reaffirmed in joint statements (e.g., 2024–2025) emphasizing anti-containment coordination.
- Ongoing summits (e.g., May 2025) produce dense agreements on defense, technology, energy, and multilateralism (BRICS, SCO), but no mutual defense pact.
Iran:
- Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (launched 2016, formalized via 25-year Cooperation Program signed March 2021): Covers economic investment (up to ~$400 billion in energy, infrastructure, transport), oil supply at discounts, trade, and security/intelligence cooperation; includes Belt and Road integration. The implementation began ~2022; includes military/defense elements (training, research, joint exercises) but not a formal alliance.
- Trilateral strategic pact with Russia (signed January 2026): Strengthens military cooperation among China, Iran, and Russia (e.g., joint naval drills), but remains non-binding.
Venezuela:
- All-Weather Strategic Partnership (upgraded 2023): Highest tier of China's bilateral partnerships; signals long-term cooperation in politics, trade, energy, and security.
- Hundreds of agreements since Hugo Chávez era (1999 onward), including ~600 cooperation projects; focus on oil-for-loans, infrastructure, and energy (e.g., joint ventures with CNPC/PDVSA).
- High-Level Joint Commission (established early 2000s) oversees political/economic ties; recent pacts (2023–2025) deepen strategic alignment, but no formal military alliance.
Cuba:
- Community with a Shared Future (agreed 2022, accelerated via Joint Declaration September 2025): First such framework with a Latin American country; promotes all-round cooperation (political trust, economic, Belt and Road, security).
- Long-standing ties since 1960 diplomatic recognition; multiple agreements on trade, biotechnology, infrastructure, cybersecurity (e.g., 2023 bilateral cybersecurity pact), and cultural exchanges.
Hmm, there’s USA’s gunboat diplomacy, and there’s everyone else’s, two wrongs, or in USA’s case multiple wrongs, don’t make a right, they’re just a thieving and waring nation, I cite
John Perkins’s “The New Confessions Of An Economic Hitman — How America really took over the world”
David Vine’s “The United States Of War — A Global history of America’s endless conflicts, from Columbus to the Islamic State”
Naomi Klein’s “The Shock Doctrine — The rise of Disaster Capitalism”🤔
I do note, despite the number of all these agreements, that what you listed is all economic or defensive. Bilateral agreements on "defense" and "security" can accurately be considered non-military if attacks on one party don't actually oblige any kind of response by the other. As you note, they aren't signing mutual defense agreements, because that would be dumb, but precisely that they see them as dumb, is that not evidence that what is going on here is not some grand anti-US military plan, but rather specifically limited agreements that are essentially economic? They aren't selling them nuclear weapons, or ballistic missiles, or attack drones (Iran makes all/most of these themselves, as far as I know), despite how helpful that would be for defeating America/Israel, because they don't actually want an escalation (and the retaliation). Contrast this with Iran's support of Hezbollah, where a direct strategic goal is (attempting to) being accomplished: Iran wanted Hezbollah to attack Israel, they were military allies, they weren't just selling them arms for profit. Iran and Hezbollah were allies in a culpable way, in a way that a 3rd party that was attacked by either could credibly retaliate against both. This is absolutely not the case with China.
This is not a pedantic difference. This is not being naive about "where these agreements could lead." These are normal economic agreements between countries, and a nation with a billion people making stuff is going to have these deals. Obviously yes, any nation will attempt to use these agreements to develop strategic benefits as well, but if we (the US) treat them as evidence that China is now friends with Iran and Hezbollah, and therefore cheering their attacks on us, that makes them far more likely to work harder to develop those strategic advantages (to our detriment) because that's why one gets strategic advantages, to counter the enemies that are trying to roll up your advantageous international agreements.
This is an self reinforcing arms race dynamic. They're escalating, so we have to escalate back. Sure, I totally understand, but if we have and end-goal of "not having a war with a nuclear power" it very much actually depends on "are they escalating, rather than just trading?" and also "even if they are escalating, is it response to our escalations, and could we cooperate to de-escalate?"
Sorry to be so picky about this. Strategically, attacking Iran because they are actual allies with Hezbollah et al. is completely valid. But I don't see any reason to play into overly hawkish China segment by extending this analogy to Iran:China.
I think they were not mutual defense pacts because that’s dangerous vs the US. And it’s dangerous precisely because the U.S. is strong and willing to use its strength.
In other words, if the U.S. didn’t do what it’s doing now, these pacts could eventually become defense ones.
No doubt at some point they could be, but then the question becomes: why do they want defense pacts? It gets really circular here!
I'm the last person to automatically blame the US for everything, but just in our interests, this strategy seems counterproductive: "we have to attack this country now before they get into a defense treaty with a stronger power"... we see how that is absolutely incentivizing that country (and every other on the Bad Dudes list) to try much harder to get an anti-US defense (defense pacts or nuclear weapons? Iran was just too slow. If we have actual self-defense reasons to attack Iran (and we do) then we should state them explicitly so that they can be accomplished. None of this "we took out one of China's friends" stuff!
Obviously the morality of starting the actual war is different, this is not both-sides-ism, but in this context, it's just a mirror of Russia and Ukraine. "We have to attack you because you're a security threat to us because you're joining another bloc." So Sweden and Finland join NATO, precisely because the advantages of joining a defense bloc have been so amply demonstrated.
My wider point is that "having economic ties of a non-actual-military-commitment nature cannot be considered membership/friendship/alliance in a strategic/military bloc BY the opposed bloc", or else you're just going to get precisely that arms-race mechanic. I get that this is substack and we're all just talking here, but we gotta start somewhere.
the Dick Cheney interpretation has things upside down. America has consistently intervened to weaken and forestall growth, modernization and prosperity for Iran, the most advanced and powerful society in west Asia, helping to maintain a clientelism that depends on foreign powers to sort matters, which replaced the Pax Ottoman. this is an American war that began in 1953 with overthrow of Mossadegh and has been waged continuously, hot and cold, since. the revolution in 1979 sought and has continued to seek modernization, development and prosperity, restrained by American violence including the Iraq aggression against Iran, sanctions and embargoes. Islam can and does seek modernization, liberalism can and does restrain and sabotage sovereign state capacity and economic development in potential rival powers. preference in the style of hats doesnt define growth/regression. the green frogs (read Taipology's latest post) mean nothing.
the projection of hebrew power over the region is completely infeasible until the reunification of Great Jerusalem, citizenship for both Hebrews and Arabs.
the wider aim is constraining the central trade corridors and integration of Asia around the persian gulf and caspian sea, which America hopes to draw Turkiye into. opposing the integration of asia is contrary to growth of global exchange and conservation. kurdistan and azeris may split off their mountain peaks like kashmir, but if this results in stability for east-west trade corridors it is not a setback to west Asian or Iranian growth. regardless of attacks on American bases in Arab countries, the consolidation of regional power by Saudi and Turkiye can be a powerful enabler of self determination, building enough strength to ignore the American military projection that compels acceptance of exclusion of arabs from great jerusalem by the israel enclave. This would be the best thing that could happen to israel, which has the military and economic resource to reunify the country, but chooses the expedient path of exclusion instead. without American shield israel would find reunification compelling.
hopefully the choking of oil through hormuz and gate of tears will bring surrender of the aggression. That and ending the war in Ukraine would likely eliminate the American extension into central and west asia, pushing it back into peaceful competition, exchange, and reengineering American services offerings to global market. the best thing that could happen for American workers and the amalgamation of north America.
Good overview, but the "Why Israel & the US Attacked Iran Again" list has one glaring omission: increasingly unpopular US president's desperate need to distract from domestic issues by asserting power where it is the least limited (military action abroad).
Actually China imports 50% of its oil from Saudi Arabia and GCC countries, vs less than 20% from Iran. Were Trump and Netanyahu not so inept at diplomacy, they could have built a heck of a coalition. Not to mention the obvious move of arming the insurrection within Iran.
Instead they went in without any solution for drone strikes. Good thing the IRGC is also inept and didn't copy Ukraine's sea drones.
Yet, compared to Bush's retarded brat gleeful speeches in the first days of the invasion of Irak, there appears to be some awareness that a big big screw-up is about to be sealed and a relative humility from this administration that may help avoid the worst. Let's hope they now properly coordinate with existing powers including China, using Saudi pressure, and do better from here on end. The thugs running Iran now will eventually fall but lack of strategic patience in Israel and the US may give them a respite.
Your articles are generally very informative and a pleasure to read, but you seem to be a bit short on the strategic details on this one, if all the other hot takes are any indication of the state of play.
Particularly the potential for this war to have a very wide range of international ramifications on nations like India and Japan and other middle powers like Türkei.
Also, the aggressors have low stockpiles of missiles and interceptors, apparently, and this will severely limit the ability for sustained conflict longer than about a month, maximum, if other commentators are correct.
I have even heard US strategic bloggers saying this could turn out to be one of the worst decisions for the Israeli US exceptionalists ever. As there is no credible off-ramp, or any reason why Iran should not fire everything they have at their enemy, and that considering the vast numbers of missiles and drones stock piled by Iran, Israel could be crippled by striking desal plants and energy platforms just off the coast. Plus many more scenarios.
Perhaps you can skim "Collapse Intelligence Agency"s substack article for an incredible piece, of details and potential problems.
As for what will happen, time will tell.
Really appreciate your articles, all the same.
Even your pro-AI stuff is a good contrast against the gloomy AI stuff.
Thanks a lot.
Thanks for your constructive criticism!
Yes, the ramifications are indeed farther-reaching. The three countries you mention are examples. I decided against adding that because I think the impact of these potential ramifications is dwarfed by the unknowns within the region.
I did mention the stockpiles, but I decided against saying anybody is short on anything, because that information is classified, so any claims of one side or the other falling short is misinformation. We will only be able to compare stockpiles as the war actually unfolds.
I think the off-ramp take from these strategic bloggers misses the point. Israel knows there is no off-ramp with Iran; there never was. As Iran exists for the purpose of eliminating Israel, there can only be two outcomes: Iran's regime falls, or Israel disappears. The 12-day war was not a war, it was a battle. The war between Iran and Israel started in 1979.
Thanks for your kind words and criticisms nonetheless!
I wish I could share your optimism with regards Iran's future Tomas, but I fear a protracted civil war or military coup seems the most likely outcome, as neither Trump nor Netanyahu cares about the Iranian people's freedom or prosperity and have made zero plans for it. Also, Trump did not succeed in regime change in Venezuela. He removed Maduro and his wife only; the regime is still otherwise entirely intact! A fact the Venezuelans are painfully aware of. Nothing Trump has ever done or will ever do will advance democracy or freedom for anyone.
The Venezuelan regime is mostly intact, but much more amenable to the US! That was the genius of it.
A military coup in Iran might be better than continuing the current regime—after all, most Gulf countries are kingdoms, and they're more amenable to Western interests and better managed internally.
Civil war would be terrible for Iranians, but I don't know how bad they would be for the West. Syria turned out well for the West. Libya is not a threat.
Appreciate the reply, but I beg to differ. If the Venezuelan regime is more amenable, it's certainly not through choice. I'm not convinced any of the charges against Maduro will even hold up in court. As for the oil Trump plans to steal, it cannot be exploited without massive investment over the years. Anything but genius.
I agree that a coup in Iran might be better for the Iranians than the current hideous regime's survival or a civil war, but the potential for another refugee crisis could destabilise the entire region and the West.
Trump's abduction of Maduro, like his war on Iran, is totally illegal. He had no UN or congressional approval for either. Not that he cares, of course, but his actions have serious ramifications for the rest of us with the abandonment of the rules-based order and a return to the law of the jungle.
I suspect both decisions were made to detract from his own increasing domestic woes and for personal enrichment, with little or no thought given to the consequences.
The biggest threat to the West and indeed the world order is Trump's criminally corrupt and belligerent presidency!
If you back away from hating Trump, you will get a clearer view if the world. You don't have to like him or agree with him to tame the bias. Cheers.
Did Tomás hate Covid-19 as he warned about it?
Please show your evidence that Trump IS NOT a big threat to the West.
I'm generally not into proving negatives.
Fair point.
But don't you agree that people may be concerned or alarmed by something/someone without "hating" it/them?
And don't you think that senior US officials like the president should tell the world what their administration knows (on climate change, Chinese wind power, Epstein, tariffs, Putin etc.) - rather than what that senior official considers their personal interest?
Why did the majorities in both houses of the US "co-equal branch of government" abrogate their duty to exercise oversight over the executive?
Do you support the US Constitution?
A big fan of your articles and your analysis. I don't entirely agree with this conclusion though. It's not clear to me that regime change is the specific outcome US is seeking. I think it's considered a risky bonus but not a base case.
- A denuclearized or significantly less nuclear-capable Iran is the first priority, both for US and Israel. This is not just regarding Iran, but further non-proliferation in the region. Saudi Arabia has said if Iran gets the bomb, they will also pursue. Probably Turkiye has same view. So allowing Iran to get a bomb has negative dominos besides Iran. (And this really stems from North Korea as the key example, i.e. if I have a nuke they won't mess with me, and Libya as the counter-example, I gave up nukes and it didn't save me.)
- Whether Iran was close to a nuke or not, Israel had a specific window of opportunity that was closing. Israel had already degraded Iranian proxies (Hezbollah), which are usually the first obstacle. And Israel has already consumed credibility globally for Gaza. So for attacking Iran, it had little to lose, because a nuclear Iran remains existential to it. Finally, the US has a president who is amenable to Israel, and is clearly comfortable with exercising military force. But that window is finite. So Israel has strong incentive to try to act now, whether nukes are imminent in Iran.
- US under this Administration has shown comfort (per Venezuela) with no true regime change, but a pseudo-client state kind of playbook. Take out Maduro, get Rodriguez to bow the knee, indifferent to Machado or actual democratic reform in Venezuela. The US doesn't need regime change as a primary outcome. So I don't entirely agree with a view that a change in regime to a democratic Iran is really a priority here.
- I don't think Iran (whomever is in charge) is necessarily stupid for hitting other Gulf countries. Threatening regional oil infra is the ONLY move. Iran cannot hurt Israel or US militarily. What can it do? It can hit the global economy. Straits of Hormuz, natural gas, refineries. Notably, Iran has not mined the Straits of Hormuz, only threatened to hit tankers, so this is leverage that can be walked back. It also has not gone all out to destroy all facilities of other Gulf states; and casualties are quite limited. Every day the oil/nat gas doesn't flow is a day that China and Europe feel pressure. Russia alone is happy for this state of war to continue. I think threatening the infrastructure here (and demonstrating the ability to hit it) is to get more folks (including Gulf states and Europe) to pressure US as leverage in the coming negotiation. Attacking Qatar with ballistic missiles and 2 aircraft is admittedly puzzling, but using 2 cheap drones to cause limited damage (not irreparable) to a crucial LNG facility is smart, because it demonstrates even when they are out of ballistic missiles, they still have cheap assets that can cause hydrocarbons to grind to a halt. (I don't think of Qatar as being an ally of Iran so much as the Switzerland of the region. It has housed both Hamas' political arm and CENTCOM at the same time.)
- If you are IRGC or remnants of the Ayatollah's beyt, you are playing for regime continuance, but with as much leverage as you can.
- For US, regime change is a bonus but not a base case. A significantly weakened Iran still under this regime is a win, and extracting more de-nuclearization steps is a win. If an uprising occurs, consider it as a risky bonus situation. A civil war, where the US selectively bombs the folks it doesn't want to win, seems very high risk. Israel has a very clean win with weakening and de-nuclearization, and a democratically elected Iran isn't necessarily a positive for Israel. But Israel had a specific window of opportunity that was closing. (Also why Hezbollah getting hit now, and why Syrian military bases were bombed when Assad fell--the strategic cost for these actions is near zero while degrading assets that can hurt Israel.)
- Importantly, note that for the Gulf region countries, a weakened Iran under authoritarian rule is the BEST case. Because a democratized Iran is actually a far worse case, for Gulf monarchies. So GCC base support of genuine regime change via ground invasion was never on the table, in my opinion.
- So currently this is about accruing leverage and providing face-saving or credibility-building actions in pursuit of the smart bet--a negotiated ceasefire which keeps the regime (maybe under IRGC) but extracts more de-nuclear steps, while hoping complete tail risks don't get out of control (e.g. can't walk back hardliners, large numbers of population killed in Gulf states or US servicepeople, near irrevocable damage to oil infrastructure, civil war in Iran). To me, lightly hitting the Gulf infrastructure on oil/gas and threatening tankers shows that there IS an off-ramp. Given a few weeks of paralyzed infrastructure, the pressure from Europe and China to get both sides to come to the table becomes REALLY strong. Because the spice must flow. And importantly, Russia is incentivized to keep the fighting on-going. So I wouldn't be surprised if Iran's hardest hardliners get more Russian aid/assistance regarding drones, based on battlefield experience in Ukraine.
This is entirely my speculation, but I've just tried to game it out as clearly as I can with realpolitik. There is plenty I don't know though, so there could be regional dynamics I have gotten completely wrong, would like to receive any critiques on mistaken assumptions here.
Agreed with most your points, except:
• I think regime change is mandatory for the US and Israel, else we're just back a few years and there's not guarantee that the next US gov will be as forthcoming. Because it's not just the nuclear threat. It's the underlying promise to kill the US / Israel.
• Weakened Iran is better than powerful democratic Iran for GCC... maybe. Unclear. Better for them if it became a monarchy, but the current version was too hostile.
• As you've seen, the US can get the spice to flow (see Trump's insurance guarantee on shipments)
Well you have saved me spending time on repeating the realpolitik for those who think this war is about anything else. Thanks
What US values are you talking about? In 1953 CIA along with MI6 orchestrated a coup that dismantled the democratically elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Code-named "Operation Ajax" (or TP-Ajax), the US-backed covert operation was designed to overthrow Mosaddegh after he nationalized the Iranian oil industry, which had previously been under British control. Following the successful overthrow, the CIA helped consolidate power around Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, who became a close U.S. ally for the next 25 years. Shah’s despotic rule, sustained by brutal repression, and the corruption that accompanied his modernizing program contributed directly to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Thanks. I am aware indeed of the history—I outlined it in one of the articles linked. What’s your point though?
The day after in Iran is death, havoc, destruction, same as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria. One quote from Eric Maria Remarque - when we bomb a city, this is strategic necessity, when others do it, it is a crime.
Ah, OK thanks.
There are 3 parts to this:
1. How is this for Iran
2. How is this for the US and the West
3. How is this for the rest of the world
I think I've covered all 3. More explicitly:
1. High risk of coups and civil wars, which might be bad in the short term for the country and the people.
2. Great because high likelihood that the emerging regime won't try to pursue nuclear weapons
3. Depends on who you are
Spot on. Historical amnesia rules courtesy of conservative legacy media (in most matters).
Are they the real elephants in our rooms?!
Good analysis overall as always, but it is worth mentioning at the beginning that, based on all that I have read regarding the history, the Shah's regime though aligned with the West was deeply unpopular in Iran (not to mention it came to power from an M16/CIA backed coup against a formerly democratic government) which allowed the 1979 revolution to occur in the first place.
EDIT: realized you did mention this in an earlier piece which you linked but I did not read yet when I posted (relatively new subscriber!)
An interesting though experiment could be if the Shah's regime, if it had survived, would have turned into a version of China (authoritarian but ultimately cares about and is driven by its economy and growth), but history is what it is.
The Shah’s Iran would not have turned into China I reckon because it depended on the U.S.
I think it would have become something like maybe Morocco.
That would have been great.
Civil society actors face tremendous obstacles to effecting regime change:
- State surveillance is pervasive: https://forbiddenstories.org/iran-regime-monitors-citizens/
- Internet is down ==> how to coordinate effectively?
- Even if some manage to some area or prisoners and occupy the local police station - how do they know that the US/Israel bombers know and won't bomb them?
Thank you for the great article, as always. I feel you missed the fact that Russia will likely benefit from this war (and the Venezuela situation) not only through higher oil prices, but also by replacing both countries in China’s oil import mix: higher oil prices and increased in direct sales to China, reducing its reliance on the shadowy black fleet, which could also increase also increase Russia’s margin.
True! Thanks for adding that
The big "if" is in your last sentence "But only if the current regime falls". This is wishful thinking. There has been no historical case of regime change through air power. Without boots on the ground from the US, it will be nearly impossible to impose a 'democratic' or pro western regime. The best they can hope for is a more pragmatic leadership, and the worst, a Libyia type scenario with a continuation of a humbled Islamic Republic is, in my opinion, the most likely.
And escalating the war in the Gulf is a desperate, but rational, move by the Islamic Republic, hoping to create a world disruption and inflation that the US cannot withstand for a long time, as very few of its citizens see the point of this war.
That is indeed the fear. But Venezuela is actually very promising here.
Did you see how Lebanon now has declared Hezbollah illegal? Without a full Israeli invasion.
Did you hear that a bomb might have killed the 88 leaders gathered to choose a replacement for Khamenei?
I don't rule out regime change here actually, but as you say civil war is perilously possible.
Civil war is not just "perilously possible." It has been going on since the end of last year (if not before). It is an almost unimaginably asymmetrical war: millions of unarmed Iranian citizens against a heavily-armed regime. I truly cannot imagine the bravery, or desperation, of the millions of Iranians who have taken to the streets even after tens of thousands of their fellow citizens have been slaughtered by their own government.
I wouldn’t call that civil war. I would call that repression.
Nothing has changed in Venezuela, apart from USA stealing its Oil, but then that’s all USA wanted, oh! apart from access to its mineral wealth. Thing is Venezuela is controlled by the cartels, whilst they may let companies enter to expand their Oil and mineral sector, once the investment from production becomes profitable they’ll take control again just like they have in the past. Now what’s the saying, oh yes, “Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice shame on me, just ask the fools at ExxonMobil🤔
For Venezuelans, maybe not much.
For the U.S., everything. No more ties with China, Russia, or Iran. No more hostility vs the west / the U.S.
If you hadn’t included China I’d have said maybe, but as you did it’s a fantasy, and being a fantasy ignoring China, Russia and Iran it could very well turn into a nightmare, and realistically Tomas, WWIII. Why! Well check out Jiang’s video. But first: A flashback to May 2024, before the U.S. elections even kicked off. This Beijing-based historian named Jiang Xueqin dropped THREE predictions that sounded completely unhinged at the time, two have already happened👇
1. DonaldTrump wins the 2024 election.
2. The United States goes to war with Iran .
3. The U.S. LOSES this Iran War and it permanently reshapes the global order of GeoPolitics.
And just how might America not win this War, well check out:
YouTube— “America Started a War They Can't Win | Prof Jiang Explains”
Be afraid, be very afraid, like Nuclear afraid for all of us😦🤔
Excellent summary, thank you for sharing this. It's so difficult to find a clear headed assessment of the situation, even from supposed news organizations.
**especially** from supposed news organizations.
Just three comments: 1) Iran is bombing neighbors in order to make chaos(oil markets, safety for rich, trying to push leaders of those countries asking USA to stop this), I think there could be more analysis on that. 2) There is a licensed shahed drones production in russia already for a while. They probably don't need iranian help that much, on the opposite - Iran is buying weaponry from Russia. 3) China is not an ally to anyone except China, and with your experience in writing about geography and geopolitics, you should probably know that more than many of us.
Good article, but important thing to note is that the IRGC cannot operate outside of the "Velayat-e Faqih" (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) structure. It is not a professional force capable of governing, nor does it have much independent agency. Rather, it is an ideological militia that already controls the country and many of its economic resources. The IRGC is already at the top and does not need to stage a coup against itself.
Yeah but who rules matters, and right now nobody does
Great article Tomas... I am generally pessimistic when bombs are flying, but the Iranian people are a unique asset...higly educated, clearly wishing for freedom, and now the door has been opened. The fact they do not have an independent way to defend themselves short of American/Israeli support is a big hole to fill.
The IRGC and the tiered Iranian military either lays down their arms for immunity or they remain defiant. I don't know the answer, but now add that Iran has made all their neighbors enemies, they have committed an absurb act of hari kari. This act of war against their only friends in the region has rarely been seen in modern warfare.
I still believe the time had come to disable this regime. Diplomacy was never in their vocabulary. In the end, although not yet clear in the fog of war, I still strongly support and believe we will help to create a new, freer Iran.
"China had collected anti-US friends in Russia, Iran and its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Hamas and the Houthis, Venezuela, Cuba, and a host of satellites considering whether to join them or not"
This kind of statement requires a lot more careful phrasing, to what actual extent really is China a friend/ally of Russia, Iran or Venezuela? Such that attacking those countries is rolling back their strategic influence, as opposed to striking their trade partners?
"If China won’t come to the rescue of its allies, and its weapons can’t stop the US, who will want to side with them?"
Doesn't this sentence immediately contradict the content of the above one? To what extent, really, was Iran using CHinese weapons, such that we would say they are "on their side?" If they aren't "coming to their rescue" and in fact isn't even weighing whether or not to do so, then how were they even remotely military friends or allies in the first place rather than just trading partners with no other commitments?
Putting these statements next to each other is really weird. The relationship between say, Iran and Hezbollah is not similar to China : Iran. Iran's govt can be bad. Hezbollah and Hamas can be bad. China's govt can be bad too, but this is just taking propaganda at face value. They can be separately bad, not everything has to be a global Axis of Evil, and you might indeed find it easier to prevent evil in one quarter by not necessarily linking it to evil in another. If you have decided that a regime is a threat, attacking their oil suppliers makes them more likely to increase the threat to you.
Hi Brian, thanks for your comment.
Below are specific agreements to back the friendship between the countries I mentioned, from Grok. The collaboration was not just economic. It was in security, military armament, and military coordination. On the weapons side, Iran recently bought notably Chinese defensive systems: HQ-16, HQ-17AE, HQ-9B, and YLC-8B. China was short of a mutual-defense pact with any of these countries because it's not stupid. It doesn't want to get mired in a foreign war. But these agreements were more and more comprehensive over time. Let them continue, and they could only strengthen.
There are many bad governments that are not part of this alliance, eg: Afghanistan, Burma (although they are getting closer to China), Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Sudan... I am calling out the ones that were getting closer to China.
Russia:
- Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era (2019): Deepens coordination across politics, economy, security, and international affairs.
- "No Limits" Partnership Joint Statement (February 2022): Declares friendship with "no limits" and "no forbidden areas of cooperation," opposing U.S.-led alliances and color revolutions; reaffirmed in joint statements (e.g., 2024–2025) emphasizing anti-containment coordination.
- Ongoing summits (e.g., May 2025) produce dense agreements on defense, technology, energy, and multilateralism (BRICS, SCO), but no mutual defense pact.
Iran:
- Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (launched 2016, formalized via 25-year Cooperation Program signed March 2021): Covers economic investment (up to ~$400 billion in energy, infrastructure, transport), oil supply at discounts, trade, and security/intelligence cooperation; includes Belt and Road integration. The implementation began ~2022; includes military/defense elements (training, research, joint exercises) but not a formal alliance.
- Trilateral strategic pact with Russia (signed January 2026): Strengthens military cooperation among China, Iran, and Russia (e.g., joint naval drills), but remains non-binding.
Venezuela:
- All-Weather Strategic Partnership (upgraded 2023): Highest tier of China's bilateral partnerships; signals long-term cooperation in politics, trade, energy, and security.
- Hundreds of agreements since Hugo Chávez era (1999 onward), including ~600 cooperation projects; focus on oil-for-loans, infrastructure, and energy (e.g., joint ventures with CNPC/PDVSA).
- High-Level Joint Commission (established early 2000s) oversees political/economic ties; recent pacts (2023–2025) deepen strategic alignment, but no formal military alliance.
Cuba:
- Community with a Shared Future (agreed 2022, accelerated via Joint Declaration September 2025): First such framework with a Latin American country; promotes all-round cooperation (political trust, economic, Belt and Road, security).
- Long-standing ties since 1960 diplomatic recognition; multiple agreements on trade, biotechnology, infrastructure, cybersecurity (e.g., 2023 bilateral cybersecurity pact), and cultural exchanges.
Hmm, there’s USA’s gunboat diplomacy, and there’s everyone else’s, two wrongs, or in USA’s case multiple wrongs, don’t make a right, they’re just a thieving and waring nation, I cite
John Perkins’s “The New Confessions Of An Economic Hitman — How America really took over the world”
David Vine’s “The United States Of War — A Global history of America’s endless conflicts, from Columbus to the Islamic State”
Naomi Klein’s “The Shock Doctrine — The rise of Disaster Capitalism”🤔
Thanks for all the other info!
I do note, despite the number of all these agreements, that what you listed is all economic or defensive. Bilateral agreements on "defense" and "security" can accurately be considered non-military if attacks on one party don't actually oblige any kind of response by the other. As you note, they aren't signing mutual defense agreements, because that would be dumb, but precisely that they see them as dumb, is that not evidence that what is going on here is not some grand anti-US military plan, but rather specifically limited agreements that are essentially economic? They aren't selling them nuclear weapons, or ballistic missiles, or attack drones (Iran makes all/most of these themselves, as far as I know), despite how helpful that would be for defeating America/Israel, because they don't actually want an escalation (and the retaliation). Contrast this with Iran's support of Hezbollah, where a direct strategic goal is (attempting to) being accomplished: Iran wanted Hezbollah to attack Israel, they were military allies, they weren't just selling them arms for profit. Iran and Hezbollah were allies in a culpable way, in a way that a 3rd party that was attacked by either could credibly retaliate against both. This is absolutely not the case with China.
This is not a pedantic difference. This is not being naive about "where these agreements could lead." These are normal economic agreements between countries, and a nation with a billion people making stuff is going to have these deals. Obviously yes, any nation will attempt to use these agreements to develop strategic benefits as well, but if we (the US) treat them as evidence that China is now friends with Iran and Hezbollah, and therefore cheering their attacks on us, that makes them far more likely to work harder to develop those strategic advantages (to our detriment) because that's why one gets strategic advantages, to counter the enemies that are trying to roll up your advantageous international agreements.
This is an self reinforcing arms race dynamic. They're escalating, so we have to escalate back. Sure, I totally understand, but if we have and end-goal of "not having a war with a nuclear power" it very much actually depends on "are they escalating, rather than just trading?" and also "even if they are escalating, is it response to our escalations, and could we cooperate to de-escalate?"
Sorry to be so picky about this. Strategically, attacking Iran because they are actual allies with Hezbollah et al. is completely valid. But I don't see any reason to play into overly hawkish China segment by extending this analogy to Iran:China.
Hmmm maybe.
I think they were not mutual defense pacts because that’s dangerous vs the US. And it’s dangerous precisely because the U.S. is strong and willing to use its strength.
In other words, if the U.S. didn’t do what it’s doing now, these pacts could eventually become defense ones.
No doubt at some point they could be, but then the question becomes: why do they want defense pacts? It gets really circular here!
I'm the last person to automatically blame the US for everything, but just in our interests, this strategy seems counterproductive: "we have to attack this country now before they get into a defense treaty with a stronger power"... we see how that is absolutely incentivizing that country (and every other on the Bad Dudes list) to try much harder to get an anti-US defense (defense pacts or nuclear weapons? Iran was just too slow. If we have actual self-defense reasons to attack Iran (and we do) then we should state them explicitly so that they can be accomplished. None of this "we took out one of China's friends" stuff!
Obviously the morality of starting the actual war is different, this is not both-sides-ism, but in this context, it's just a mirror of Russia and Ukraine. "We have to attack you because you're a security threat to us because you're joining another bloc." So Sweden and Finland join NATO, precisely because the advantages of joining a defense bloc have been so amply demonstrated.
My wider point is that "having economic ties of a non-actual-military-commitment nature cannot be considered membership/friendship/alliance in a strategic/military bloc BY the opposed bloc", or else you're just going to get precisely that arms-race mechanic. I get that this is substack and we're all just talking here, but we gotta start somewhere.
Yeah, strategic nuance and not seeing the world in two blocs is just outside the realm of the possible in a DC brain. Unfortunate.
the Dick Cheney interpretation has things upside down. America has consistently intervened to weaken and forestall growth, modernization and prosperity for Iran, the most advanced and powerful society in west Asia, helping to maintain a clientelism that depends on foreign powers to sort matters, which replaced the Pax Ottoman. this is an American war that began in 1953 with overthrow of Mossadegh and has been waged continuously, hot and cold, since. the revolution in 1979 sought and has continued to seek modernization, development and prosperity, restrained by American violence including the Iraq aggression against Iran, sanctions and embargoes. Islam can and does seek modernization, liberalism can and does restrain and sabotage sovereign state capacity and economic development in potential rival powers. preference in the style of hats doesnt define growth/regression. the green frogs (read Taipology's latest post) mean nothing.
the projection of hebrew power over the region is completely infeasible until the reunification of Great Jerusalem, citizenship for both Hebrews and Arabs.
the wider aim is constraining the central trade corridors and integration of Asia around the persian gulf and caspian sea, which America hopes to draw Turkiye into. opposing the integration of asia is contrary to growth of global exchange and conservation. kurdistan and azeris may split off their mountain peaks like kashmir, but if this results in stability for east-west trade corridors it is not a setback to west Asian or Iranian growth. regardless of attacks on American bases in Arab countries, the consolidation of regional power by Saudi and Turkiye can be a powerful enabler of self determination, building enough strength to ignore the American military projection that compels acceptance of exclusion of arabs from great jerusalem by the israel enclave. This would be the best thing that could happen to israel, which has the military and economic resource to reunify the country, but chooses the expedient path of exclusion instead. without American shield israel would find reunification compelling.
hopefully the choking of oil through hormuz and gate of tears will bring surrender of the aggression. That and ending the war in Ukraine would likely eliminate the American extension into central and west asia, pushing it back into peaceful competition, exchange, and reengineering American services offerings to global market. the best thing that could happen for American workers and the amalgamation of north America.
Good overview, but the "Why Israel & the US Attacked Iran Again" list has one glaring omission: increasingly unpopular US president's desperate need to distract from domestic issues by asserting power where it is the least limited (military action abroad).
Possible
Actually China imports 50% of its oil from Saudi Arabia and GCC countries, vs less than 20% from Iran. Were Trump and Netanyahu not so inept at diplomacy, they could have built a heck of a coalition. Not to mention the obvious move of arming the insurrection within Iran.
Instead they went in without any solution for drone strikes. Good thing the IRGC is also inept and didn't copy Ukraine's sea drones.
Yet, compared to Bush's retarded brat gleeful speeches in the first days of the invasion of Irak, there appears to be some awareness that a big big screw-up is about to be sealed and a relative humility from this administration that may help avoid the worst. Let's hope they now properly coordinate with existing powers including China, using Saudi pressure, and do better from here on end. The thugs running Iran now will eventually fall but lack of strategic patience in Israel and the US may give them a respite.