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Barry Stevens's avatar

Thanks for this new focus of yours. There's quite a lot to discuss here. But I want to challenge one thing and add another. First: the suggestion that the Japanese were not ready to surrender isn't accurate. They were making overtures for a surrender via the Soviets (oops) and elsewhere. The US had broken the Japanese codes thru "Magic" intercept and the top leadership of the US knew this. The Japanese wanted a condition: to preserve the imperial throne. Some in the US leadership wanted to accept this (it might save US lives, for one thing). But the influential Secretary of State, J Byrnes, wanted to preserve 'unconditional surrender'. He won the argument. (Possibly, to make certain they didn't surrender before the USA had tried out the Bomb on a city -- unclear.) Secondly: It's not at all certain that the A-Bombs were decisive for the Japanese leadership. The firebombing of Japan had destroyed pretty much every city except four or five. For example, a Tokyo bombing in March killed more people in one night than would die later in Hiroshima. So the Japanese leaders (not an empathetic bunch) were used to cities disappearing in fire. Historians debate when the leadership first discussed the A-Bomb, but what is apparent is that the Soviet attack on Japanese-held territory (on the same day as the Nagasaki bomb) really focused their minds on surrender. And in the end, the USA agreed to keep the Emperor anyway! Likely, they could have had victory without the A-Bomb. But the narrative of saving 100s of 1000s of US lives continues to this day. And the Japanese preferred the idea that this 'cruel bomb' was what won the war, rather than the fact they were beaten before that. (I can send citations if you want.) Anyway, I look forward to the next article.

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Rodrigo Llaca's avatar

I´m glad that Tomas is back

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