Thanks for this new focus of yours. There's quite a lot to discuss here. But I want to challenge one thing and add another. First: the suggestion that the Japanese were not ready to surrender isn't accurate. They were making overtures for a surrender via the Soviets (oops) and elsewhere. The US had broken the Japanese codes thru "Magic" intercept and the top leadership of the US knew this. The Japanese wanted a condition: to preserve the imperial throne. Some in the US leadership wanted to accept this (it might save US lives, for one thing). But the influential Secretary of State, J Byrnes, wanted to preserve 'unconditional surrender'. He won the argument. (Possibly, to make certain they didn't surrender before the USA had tried out the Bomb on a city -- unclear.) Secondly: It's not at all certain that the A-Bombs were decisive for the Japanese leadership. The firebombing of Japan had destroyed pretty much every city except four or five. For example, a Tokyo bombing in March killed more people in one night than would die later in Hiroshima. So the Japanese leaders (not an empathetic bunch) were used to cities disappearing in fire. Historians debate when the leadership first discussed the A-Bomb, but what is apparent is that the Soviet attack on Japanese-held territory (on the same day as the Nagasaki bomb) really focused their minds on surrender. And in the end, the USA agreed to keep the Emperor anyway! Likely, they could have had victory without the A-Bomb. But the narrative of saving 100s of 1000s of US lives continues to this day. And the Japanese preferred the idea that this 'cruel bomb' was what won the war, rather than the fact they were beaten before that. (I can send citations if you want.) Anyway, I look forward to the next article.
I can write privately with detail and primary sources, but to keep it short: Sherwin and Bird's "American Prometheus" (the movie "Oppenheimer" was based on this book) has good details and sources about the fact that the US knew the Japanese were trying to surrender as early as February (See Ch 22). Also has some of the evidence that the purpose of dropping the A-bomb was to threaten (or deter) the Soviets more than avoid an invasion of Japan. "Mission With LeMay" by Curtis LeMay and Fred Kaplan's "The Wizards of Armageddon" and Kaplan's "The Bomb" back up the idea that conventional bombing was about to defeat Japan. The leaders who thought the A-Bomb unnecessary included Eisenhower, Adm. Leahy, and Herbert Hoover, cited in Daniel Ellsberg's "The Doomsday Machine", "The Untold History of the United States" by Stone and Kuznick, and Scott Horton's "Hotter Than The Sun". A detailed account from Japanese sources about their worrying more about the Soviets and communism causing the loss of the Emperor than the A-Bombs' destruction comes from Ward Wilson's "It Is Possible" but in other books too. Forrest Morgan's "Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan" has Japanese sources downplaying the A-Bomb's menace. "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" by Gar Alperovitz is an early revisionist history.
Great article. And very timely because Belgian soldiers did fight and die over there to help the US against the Chinese aggressor. There is currently a series running on Belgian TV about this 'forgotten' war.
I changed the map at the last minute because the detail of the previous one was not enough. I probably found one that is posterior! Sorry about that. The gist stands: the type of map they had was woefully inadequate for this purpose.
Thanks, Tomas. Especially interesting to me because my older brother was on the front from '51-'53, and I was too young to understand what was going on. Looking forward to another of your geography lessons regarding the 38th parallel.
Nicely done of course it’s way more complicated but might just be one of the best digests of the Korean conflict I’ve ever read, also, one of the shortest.
That anecdote about Bonesteel and Rusk is fascinating. I knew most of this but that was new to me. ("Bonesteel" is possibly the coolest name I've ever heard.)
As a Chinese reader who has studied this period a bit, I believe that even if Japan had surrendered several months earlier, the USSR would likely still have sent troops into northeastern China. The Chinese Communist Party needed Soviet support to defeat the Nationalist Kuomintang. Additionally, I don’t think the U.S. or the southern part of Korea had the resources at the time to take control of the entire Korean peninsula. Btw, Kim Il Sung was part of the Chinese communist forces before he’s the leader of North Korea. He would have fought whoever wanted to take over Korea from the west.
Il y a une erreur à la fin de cet article: l’armistice n’a pas été signee entre la Corée du Nord et la Corée du Sud mais par des représentants de la Corée du Nord, de la Chine et des UN. La Corée du Sud est absente de ce statut et ne peux donc pas aujourd’hui ou demain signer un acte de paix directement avec la Corée du Nord.
Some years ago I saw a doco which talked about an election or plebiscite in the South (prior to war breaking out), in which the majority elected union under socialism.
Is this true or as historically clouded as my old memory?
Thanks for this new focus of yours. There's quite a lot to discuss here. But I want to challenge one thing and add another. First: the suggestion that the Japanese were not ready to surrender isn't accurate. They were making overtures for a surrender via the Soviets (oops) and elsewhere. The US had broken the Japanese codes thru "Magic" intercept and the top leadership of the US knew this. The Japanese wanted a condition: to preserve the imperial throne. Some in the US leadership wanted to accept this (it might save US lives, for one thing). But the influential Secretary of State, J Byrnes, wanted to preserve 'unconditional surrender'. He won the argument. (Possibly, to make certain they didn't surrender before the USA had tried out the Bomb on a city -- unclear.) Secondly: It's not at all certain that the A-Bombs were decisive for the Japanese leadership. The firebombing of Japan had destroyed pretty much every city except four or five. For example, a Tokyo bombing in March killed more people in one night than would die later in Hiroshima. So the Japanese leaders (not an empathetic bunch) were used to cities disappearing in fire. Historians debate when the leadership first discussed the A-Bomb, but what is apparent is that the Soviet attack on Japanese-held territory (on the same day as the Nagasaki bomb) really focused their minds on surrender. And in the end, the USA agreed to keep the Emperor anyway! Likely, they could have had victory without the A-Bomb. But the narrative of saving 100s of 1000s of US lives continues to this day. And the Japanese preferred the idea that this 'cruel bomb' was what won the war, rather than the fact they were beaten before that. (I can send citations if you want.) Anyway, I look forward to the next article.
Thank you! Yes please do send citations! Short ones though. Primary sources ideally!
I can write privately with detail and primary sources, but to keep it short: Sherwin and Bird's "American Prometheus" (the movie "Oppenheimer" was based on this book) has good details and sources about the fact that the US knew the Japanese were trying to surrender as early as February (See Ch 22). Also has some of the evidence that the purpose of dropping the A-bomb was to threaten (or deter) the Soviets more than avoid an invasion of Japan. "Mission With LeMay" by Curtis LeMay and Fred Kaplan's "The Wizards of Armageddon" and Kaplan's "The Bomb" back up the idea that conventional bombing was about to defeat Japan. The leaders who thought the A-Bomb unnecessary included Eisenhower, Adm. Leahy, and Herbert Hoover, cited in Daniel Ellsberg's "The Doomsday Machine", "The Untold History of the United States" by Stone and Kuznick, and Scott Horton's "Hotter Than The Sun". A detailed account from Japanese sources about their worrying more about the Soviets and communism causing the loss of the Emperor than the A-Bombs' destruction comes from Ward Wilson's "It Is Possible" but in other books too. Forrest Morgan's "Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan" has Japanese sources downplaying the A-Bomb's menace. "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" by Gar Alperovitz is an early revisionist history.
Please keep on with Korea. Always a pleasure to follow you down whatever rabbit hole you dive into.
I´m glad that Tomas is back
Great article. And very timely because Belgian soldiers did fight and die over there to help the US against the Chinese aggressor. There is currently a series running on Belgian TV about this 'forgotten' war.
https://www.vrt.be/vrtmax/a-z/belgen-in-oorlog--korea/
This Asia and adjacent areas map attached in this article couldn't have been from before 1947. India was divided into India and Pakistan in 1947.
I changed the map at the last minute because the detail of the previous one was not enough. I probably found one that is posterior! Sorry about that. The gist stands: the type of map they had was woefully inadequate for this purpose.
Ah okay. That's what I was wondering about! Anyway Thanks for this post. Looking forward to more on Korea!
Great story, thanks for writing and sharing it!
Thanks, Tomas. Especially interesting to me because my older brother was on the front from '51-'53, and I was too young to understand what was going on. Looking forward to another of your geography lessons regarding the 38th parallel.
This was a fantastic read - thank you!
Very interesting, thanks.
Nicely done of course it’s way more complicated but might just be one of the best digests of the Korean conflict I’ve ever read, also, one of the shortest.
That was the goal! To make it as short and insightful as possible!
This was enthralling, so glad there is more coming up in this series !
That anecdote about Bonesteel and Rusk is fascinating. I knew most of this but that was new to me. ("Bonesteel" is possibly the coolest name I've ever heard.)
And the DMZ zone has worked for beatifully for 75 years. The same approach will work with GAZA
Interesting comparison!
As a Chinese reader who has studied this period a bit, I believe that even if Japan had surrendered several months earlier, the USSR would likely still have sent troops into northeastern China. The Chinese Communist Party needed Soviet support to defeat the Nationalist Kuomintang. Additionally, I don’t think the U.S. or the southern part of Korea had the resources at the time to take control of the entire Korean peninsula. Btw, Kim Il Sung was part of the Chinese communist forces before he’s the leader of North Korea. He would have fought whoever wanted to take over Korea from the west.
Il y a une erreur à la fin de cet article: l’armistice n’a pas été signee entre la Corée du Nord et la Corée du Sud mais par des représentants de la Corée du Nord, de la Chine et des UN. La Corée du Sud est absente de ce statut et ne peux donc pas aujourd’hui ou demain signer un acte de paix directement avec la Corée du Nord.
I learned something new today.
Thanks!
As usual, Tomas, hard to argue with your facts.
Some years ago I saw a doco which talked about an election or plebiscite in the South (prior to war breaking out), in which the majority elected union under socialism.
Is this true or as historically clouded as my old memory?