Interesting breakdown, but looking at this from Central Europe, your diagnosis has a huge blind spot: you didn't mention the Eurozone or the European Central Bank once.
You treat France like a closed island where people just decided to be lazy and pamper retirees, and you conclude the government can "rebalance its budget overnight" by raising the retirement age and cutting student perks. But that ignores how the plumbing actually works.
First, that headline figure of France spending ~57% of GDP on public expenditure is misleading. People assume that money goes into classrooms, clinics, and trains. It doesn't. Over the last decade, the French state turned into a giant pass-through: over €150 billion a year goes straight into private-sector subsidies and tax exemptions for large corporations (aides aux entreprises), while debt interest paid to private bondholders eats over €60 billion annually. The state isn't running out of cash because of €1 cafeteria lunches; it’s siphoning public funds upward.
Second, France gave up its monetary sovereignty decades ago. It can’t devalue, and the central bank cannot backstop its treasury. Because Paris is locked into the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact deficit limits, something has to give. Bond interest is legally untouchable, military spending is climbing, and corporate subsidies are defended to prevent capital flight. That leaves schools, universities, and hospitals as the only flexible line items the government can squeeze to hit EU targets. That's why real spending per student dropped roughly 20% since 2017 while private wealth in France doubled.
When you spend half the article on suburban looters, €1 lunches, and ethnic demographics, you're looking at the noise at the bottom of the funnel. The barricades aren't burning because French teenagers are uniquely coddled. They burn because the public sphere is being structurally hollowed out to service an external fiscal cage.
Lots of other countries in Europe have a similar problem, yet don't get the same riots. WHich is why I discuss pensions (France is the most egregious), but don't only focus on pensions.
If you zoom in on public *social* spending (health, old age, incapacity-related benefits, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment, housing, etc.), France is still one of the biggest spenders in the OECD (along with Austria and Finland):
Fair point, France does spend a lot on social protection. That model worked while borrowing was cheap and growth was ok. Now France can’t devalue, the ECB isn’t going to backstop it, and the deficit rules leave little room. On top of that you have a growing defence and Ukraine bill and oil back above $100 because of the Iran war. Yields at a 24 year high show the markets see all of it hitting at once.
And the burden isn’t spread evenly. Most French retirees own their home, and the young mostly don’t and can’t afford to. So the old keep their pensions and their property, and the young pay the rent and the taxes. I think that’s a big part of why they are the ones on the street.
Tomas is right that others have similar problems without the riots (OK, they have protest, but not so fierce). But France has the squeeze, the stuck parliament and this generational gap all at once.
No matter how much anyone has if they start having less they will be less happy than people who always had less but are getting more. Unfortunately very little can infinitely increase.
Agreed. A shared currency without shared fiscal backing leaves countries with no devaluation and no real lender of last resort, and a crisis exposes that.
And when help does come, it has strings.*
*Italy’s Covid recovery money (about €194bn) is paid in instalments, only when Rome hits agreed milestones. Those include competition laws that make tenders the default for concessions, and make municipalities justify keeping local services in-house. Private clinics also got easier accreditation into the public health system, and taxi licensing was pushed to open up. Beach concessions (balneari) have to go to open tender by 2027 too.
I'd argue that's actually good. Italy is prone to bad laws for competition, because some people can capture parts of the economy. These liberalizations are good for all.
I do read your articles with great interest, and it is the first time I see myself disagreeing with you.
1- Saying that every euro country is in the same shitty situation but french are the only one to unrest, which is caused by entitlement issue is strange to me.
The others SHOULD unrest. When you cite 700k people studying in bad conditions in UK but "they never protest" , is not a great look.
Yes they should protest because everyone has the right to study in good conditions.
It's like saying in 18th century protesting for democracy and freedom is strange because everyone else lives in royalist and authoritarian régime.
2- you missed the point on police brutality , and I was shocked that you lower the bar of police violence by comparing it to Iranian police.
documentary , you will see that most often than not, rioters are caused by the police gassing people when there is NO violence in the first place.
3- you say that LFI (not extreme left as per the conseil d'etat ruling) is running this in the background but yet offer few evidence to support that claim. Even prosecutors said that people arrested were not necessarily from extreme left , and renseignements généraux did not say that LFI was coordinating the movement.
Your analysis identifies many of France's immediate problems, but I believe the riots are symptoms of something far more consequential: decades of political decisions that have produced an unsustainable economic and social model. France's challenge is not a lack of resources, talent, or opportunity. It is a political system that seems incapable of reconciling its promises with any sort economic reality. If that remains static, it is a non-starter for correcting any part of the problems France and much of Europe have built into their political systems.
France remains an extraordinary country with enormous intellectual, industrial, and technological strengths. Yet its government has created expectations that economic growth and public finances can no longer comfortably support.
Pension reform is unavoidable, although simply raising the retirement age without considering differences in life expectancy, occupational demands, and individual circumstances is hardly equitable. Gradual adjustments, incentives to remain employed, reduced regulatory burdens, and policies encouraging entrepreneurship would offer a more sustainable approach.
Wealth must be created before it can be redistributed.
Education presents another challenge. Spending on more administrators, not teachers, means little without measurable improvement. Look at the percentage of admin/teachers and adjust accordingly. Create a teacher/administrator percentage that is codified. Stronger academic standards, vocational opportunities, and closer relationships between schools and employers could substantially improve economic mobility. Use company expertise in areas that can create jobs and apprenticesships.
Immigration, however, may represent France's most complicated long-term challenge—not necessarily because of immigration itself, but because of failures in integration that most of Europe has lost the concept of integration instead of just adding people who bring their culture with them, and they remain outside any acculturation. This has created the most division and until countries in Europe change, they will not solve any of the overiding issues that are a result of this cultural divide.
Countries such as America, Canada, and Australia demonstrate immigration's enormous potential when newcomers have opportunities to participate economically and socially. France's circumstances differ, including its colonial history, established immigrant communities, and distinct secular traditions. These differences matter and they are a poor starting point for France and Europe in general.
Economic immigration policies should emphasize skills, language proficiency, and employment potential, while respecting humanitarian responsibilities. Equally important, France must address the concentrated poverty, inadequate educational opportunities, and unemployment that have left many immigrant families feeling excluded from French society.
Second- and third-generation immigrants are French citizens, not newcomers awaiting acceptance. Their ability to participate fully in French economic and civic life is essential. Integration requires responsibilities from individuals, but also genuine opportunities provided by society.
Religious freedom and cultural identity deserve protection, but neither should supersede French law or fundamental democratic principles. A shared national identity need not require abandoning one's heritage. It works, but only if it is aFeance first, cultural identity second.
Illegal immigration should be high on the list for the government, but it should also be consistent and humane enforcement, with appropriate removal procedures and deportation of serious criminal offenders quickly, but within what the law requires.
As for the riots, even legitimate grievances never justify violence. Destroying schools, businesses, and public infrastructure ultimately harms the very communities that need improvement. Accountability must apply equally to violent offenders and police misconduct.
Artificial intelligence offers France a remarkable opportunity to modernize government, improve education, and increase productivity. Whether political leadership embraces that opportunity is unlikely, but it should be the rallying cry of all French citizens.
With all that said, France's greatest obstacle may be neither immigration nor economic inequality, but political paralysis. Meaningful reform requires confronting entrenched interests, acknowledging uncomfortable realities, and recognizing that preserving every existing arrangement is no longer possible.
The riots may capture the headlines, but France's inability to reform may prove far more damaging than the riots themselves.
Most of what you propose is common sense reforms. I don't think the problem is these solutions are unknown. Instead, it looks like what's going on is structural political gridlock and entrenched ideological pathology. That hard working, peaceful, and successful Asian immigrant are vilified tells the whole story.
I find it astonishing that in your analysis there was no section discussing French colonialism among the root causes. It's not by accident that there are so many immigrants, 1st and 2nd generation in France from the former French colonies. By the way, I am an American, born in U.S.A., was a university student in France in the early 60's, am well versed in French history, fluent in French and have remained in contact with friends there, History does play a role in the ongoing social, economic, and political problems in France. Comparing to Canada is simplistic.
Spain had 500 years of colonialism, yet until the 1990s barely any Latin American immigrant (or any immigration for that matter). Same for Portugal.
This shows that immigration is not the consequence of colonialism.
The immigrants that went into France did so not because they had been oppressed by France, but because France offered them opportunities and welfare.
When you're Algerian and you want to escape your country, the your best bet is France, which is much richer, much closer than alternatives, and speaks French like most Algerians do.
So no, I don't think colonization has a role here, but maybe I'm missing it?
Well, the immigration opportunities due to a shared language language goes in the pros column of colonialism for them, but that doesn't conclude the question of whether the pros or cons column comes out ahead on net.
Unlike Spanish colonized peoples, who had to cross the Atlantic Ocean, French colonized peoples only needed to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, during WWI and WWII, the French government promised citizenship to volunteers from its colonies who fought for France.
I've been interested in your writing since the beginning but sometimes I wonder about the depth. Here, for instance, I wonder why you insert the video about the kids being apparently hysterical in only wanting to break, without any reason (after "violence against public officials, and incitement to unlawful assembly."). It is weird in the text at that moment. And then ... the video is probably doctored, starting in France Place de La Republique, but then finishing in another country (the building in the end is not in Paris, and there is Bolt bicycle in the stack, hence NOT PARIS). I suspect the kid talking is NOT IN PARIS.
Thomas: except if you goal is ideological, such carelessness is irresponsible.
There is some wisdom in the rest of the letter, but please, please please, can your source info not only by truthfullness and by representativeness ???
Hi Fabrice, thank you for your take. Let me help here.
Although the demonstrations started in Paris, they spread through the country. That's why it's titled Why France Is in Chaos. The article covers it all, which means the video might start in Paris, but then covers Limoges (where the city hall burned), Lyon (where the tourism office burnt), Marseille (where people stormed an official building), etc. The very fist video, at the top of the article, says in the middle "Marseille".
I added Belgium because something very informative happened there: It's a different country than France, so the same system doesn't apply, and hence the student complaints can't be the same either. Yet the riots spread there too.
But only on the French side of Belgium, not the Dutch-speaking Flanders. I think that's crucial in showing a mechanism by which the riots spread: Not because of the demands, but because of the language. This was social and cultural spread.
Unfortunately, I had a small paragraph explaining this in a caption but it got lost when I ported it to publication. I have now updated it back in. So thanks for that.
Indeed, the Walloon region of Belgium is very connected to what happens in France. It is also economically , linguistically and culturally more or less connected to the French - Walloon has a lot of debts and is fed from the Flanders treasury . They also share a common ancestry with the French going back to the Roman Gaul. The Flanders region of Belgium has had no demonstrations concerning these topics at this time as far as I know . And Brussels - as someone in the US once said - is a real hellhole as far as some parts ( Schaarbeek , Molenbeek , .. ) are concerned.
Furthermore, Walloon and Brussels region are more left-wing (Partie Socialiste) then the Flemings.
I wrote a whole book about France, hence I'm pretty curious about people write about it... (« Oui ! la France est un paradis pour entrepreneurs » (Plon 2016)). So "why France in chaos" primed me on a France analysis...
I like many of your analyses and love your bent into visualization.
However, as a professional social scientist, I'm often puzzled about the boundaries of your thinking process, when it edges into "crypto-boy territory" ;) I hope you take it with a grain of salt ;)
Thanks for this interaction anyway, and congrats for your work,
What video are you referring to exactly? The one at the top of the article? Or the 'Tout casser " video that was shot in Brussels or Liege (Belgium) or yet another?
It certainly is in Belgium. The name on the board is that of Valérie Glatigny (ministre de l'Enseignement obligatoire en Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles).
Yes, so now I'm confused because that video is really designed to confuse viewer, trying to make believe that "place de la republic" riots is related to such statements. And why is Pueyo using it there, a video deliberating confusing location in a post talking about FRANCE, by someone who is suposed to be geographer. I'm disappointed.
To show how interesting and different the world and different societies are I want to give a perspective from the North-Eastern Europe. In Estonia, the Baltics, Finland, Norway or Denmark riots like this would never happen. Just no.
Here is a perspective from Estonia, where children can go to school on their own on foot or by public transport from age 7, and where we don't understand why so many US movies are about safety of your children and family. Here in Estonia safety just is. One example on how safety is achieved is the following. Here is a news about police taking into custody illegal immigrants (sent by Belarus) from a tip by a local resident. https://news.err.ee/1610163868/police-detain-10-illegal-immigrants-in-tallinn-s-nomme-district
Imagine in France if the police would ask the pulic to report on "suspicious immigrant looking people" and actually then catching the illigal immigrants and sending them back. :-)
When I was a child in the US I walked back from school on foot with my brother. Movies are movies: they need some sort of dramatic conflict to be interesting.
You acknowledge that racial discrimination exists... then argue that it “reflects reality” because certain immigrant groups supposedly commit more crime and contribute less economically.
That’s quite a leap 😅
You even cite evidence that socioeconomic status explains a lot of the differences in school behaviour, YET you keep coming back to ethnicity as an explanation. You mention poverty, discrimination, and segregation... but ultimately seem to blame the communities affected by them!
Of course, we can condemn riots, talk about crime and debate immigration policy... But there’s a difference between discussing statistics and using them to paint ENTIRE ethnic groups as less productive or more criminal.
What bothers me most is that you present this article as a data-driven analysis... when so many of the conclusions go beyond what the data actually shows!
Acknowledging that discrimination exists and then arguing that it’s justified by the behaviour of the group being discriminated against is a VERY troubling contradiction.
Imagine the baseline crime rate is 0.1%, but a minority is 50x more likely to commit crime.
That means the crime rate of that minority is 5%.
It means that a standard citizen, when walking on the streets, should be 50x more fearful to be attacked by the minority than by the majority, since coming across the minority is 50x riskier.
However, it also means that 95% of the minority is law-abiding citizens. So the fact that people are scared of the 5% is unfair to the 95%.
How do we solve this?
The first thing is not to deny that there is a 5% crime rate in the minority, because that's a reality that everybody can witness, and they will be angry that it doesn't get addressed. They will especially be angry at those who hide it, because they prevent the problem from being solved.
But also, as that is done, work needs to be done to acknowledge discrimination and reduce it, so that the 95% doesn't pay for the 5%.
Which is why it's actually very important that the 95% denounces the 5%: That way they get both the reduction in crime from the minority and the signaling that they are on the side of the law, and not on that of the ethnicity.
In data analysis, you need to make decision based on imperfect information. That's the key. You never have 100% confidence on anything. You get it as high as you can, and then make a decision.
So tell me, which of the conclusions specifically are you concerned about, that you think the data doesn't support?
I agree that two things can be true at once. I'm not arguing that we should ignore uncomfortable statistics.
But your hypothetical assumes precisely what needs to be demonstrated: that a minority is 50 times more likely to commit crime. More importantly, relative risk alone doesn't tell us how much danger an individual poses. We need to look at absolute rates, the type of crime, the population being compared, and the factors that might explain the difference.
My concern with your article is more specific than that, though. You write that discrimination against Maghrebis “reflects reality” because immigrants from certain backgrounds supposedly commit more crime and contribute less economically. Yet your own analysis of school behaviour finds that socioeconomic status predicts problems better than immigrant share, and that controlling for socioeconomic status reduces the correlation substantially, sometimes to almost zero.
You acknowledge poverty, segregation and discrimination as part of a vicious cycle, but then return to ethnicity and “lower human capital from some specific countries and ethnicities” as an explanation. That conclusion requires more evidence than correlations between immigrant share, school behaviour, crime and economic outcomes. It also requires distinguishing ethnicity from nationality, immigration status, socioeconomic circumstances and other potentially relevant factors.
The fact that most members of a group are law-abiding doesn't settle the question. I'm not disputing that disparities may exist - I'm questioning whether your data establishes WHY they exist and whether it justifies the conclusions you draw from them.
A statistical difference is a starting point for investigation, NOT proof of its own explanation.
So, to answer your question directly, I'm particularly concerned about your conclusion that discrimination “reflects reality,” your claim that immigrants from certain ethnic backgrounds have lower human capital, and your suggestion that resident immigrants who commit these crimes should immediately lose their status and be deported.
I'd like to see the evidence supporting each of them, rather than treating observed disparities as proof of their underlying cause.
It is not just the many times higher involvement in crime (on average) by some ethnic groups that cause problems it is also the very different and generally hostile and unpleasant attitudes of some immigrants that cause problems for natives.
We know from extensive studies in Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK and other countries that on average and collectively Muslims and Arabs take much more from the state than they contribute. So we lose on every sale, but make up for it on the volume?
Over-controlling is rightly called the Sociologist's fallacy. Low human capital (cognitive ability, executive function, time preference etc) is much more common in Africans and Muslims. Low human capital is to some extent genetic. Parents with low human capital will have low socioeconomic status. If you control away SES you control away the cause you are looking at.
Thought experiment. 90% of Bomalians have IQ <85 and crime involvement 10 times that of natives and a lower socioeconomic status. The 10% who have IQ >85 and crime involvement comparable to natives have comparable socioeconomic status. Controlling for socio-economic status Bomalians have the same educational achievement and incarceration % as natives.
Ergo Bomalians poor school achievement is duet to socio-economis status we should not discriminate against Bomalians and should allow infinity immigration from Bomalia and massive re-distribution from natives until all the Bomalians have the same educational outcomes as natives.
I'd like to see the actual evidence for everything you just said.
Which studies establish that Muslims and Arabs, as groups, are net fiscal burdens across these countries? Fiscal contributions vary with age, employment, education, and migration status, so I'd want to see how those factors were accounted for.
What evidence establishes that differences in crime or socioeconomic outcomes are GENETIC? Showing that a group has a lower average score or a different outcome doesn't establish why. Heritability within a population doesn't prove that differences between populations have a genetic cause.
Your Somali example doesn't demonstrate your argument either. You've built a hypothetical around specific numbers without providing a source for them, then used it to draw conclusions about genetics and policy. That's not evidence = it's an illustration based on assumptions you've chosen!
I'm not arguing that group differences should be ignored. I'm asking you to distinguish between measured disparities, explanations for those disparities, and the policy conclusions you draw from them. Those are three different things, and evidence for one doesn't automatically establish the others.
Tomas, I understand and agree with your take on immigrant crime.
I think the rhetoric around this issue is skewed by Americentrism. In America, immigrants commit fewer crimes than natives. It's the opposite in Europe. We should be able to talk about different situations differently. https://www.theargumentmag.com/p/why-america-is-so-much-better-than
Despite broadly agreeing with you on this issue, I too was a bit bothered by the fact that you left it at this in your essay:
1. There is discrimination.
2. The discrimination "reflects reality," because of higher relative rates of crime.
I factually agree with those, but would have liked to see something more nuanced, such as by adding:
3. The discrimination feels bad and results in unfair treatment, because of low absolute rates of crime.
Relative vs. absolute is a big distinction that cuts in both ways. To use the numbers from your thought experiment above, say a group commits crimes at a base rate of 5%. It would be unfortunate and unjust if this meant nobody would hire members of that group for jobs or admit them to universities. I think it would be reasonable to be upset about that discrimination (and hopefully to express it in a more effective way than these riots).
I think one way of defining "stereotyping" is: inaccurately extrapolating high relative rates to high absolute rates. I think a society invested in justice - and especially one invested in liberal individualism rather than identity politics - has an interest in fighting against this inaccurate tendency. That means we need to be conscious of bias and not discriminate more than absolute rates justify. This is especially true in areas like employment, education, housing, etc., because being unfairly excluded from those can cause major disadvantages.
He actually takes care to mention that most Maghrebi and Africans do OK and trouble is caused by a minority of criminals.
As for the possibility that some groups on average do better than other, that is something that must be considered if effective policy is to be made, though painful for some and, granted, a dangerous slope also - though denial is perhaps the straightest path to really dangerous discrimination.
You can say “it's only a minority” while still reinforcing stereotypes about entire ethnic groups.
I'm not saying that group differences should never be studied or that policy should ignore evidence. I'm arguing that correlation doesn't establish causation, and that socioeconomic factors, segregation, and discrimination matter (A LOT!) when interpreting these statistics. The article itself presents evidence that socioeconomic status explains a substantial part of the differences in school behaviour.
Of course, we need evidence-based policy. But there's a difference between using data to understand WHY certain problems occur and using group-level statistics to portray particular ethnicities as more criminal or less productive. The former can help address problems, while the latter risks reinforcing the very discrimination we're trying to understand!
And denial isn't the only alternative to accepting the author's conclusions. We can examine uncomfortable data critically without jumping to ethnic generalizations.
Some people will always hate difference, that is not a reason to pretend it doesn't exist.
Like, an overwhelming majority of violent crime is done by one group: males aged 12-30. Fortunately we can say that without some getting all worked up and make policy and police action accordingly. Yes some women will claim that that's proof that men are evil but they're safely ignored, and you can do the same with the people that will pretend that all Africans are bad because some of them are criminals.
There's a difference between acknowledging statistical differences between groups and using those statistics to justify generalisations about individuals.
If the data show that young men are disproportionately responsible for certain violent crimes, we can acknowledge that and use it to inform policy. But that doesn't mean men as a group are evil, or that any individual man should be treated as dangerous.
The same logic applies to any other demographic group. You can discuss reliable statistics about specific populations and specific outcomes without concluding that those populations are inherently bad. The question is what the data actually demonstrates, and whether the conclusions drawn from it are justified.
Acknowledging differences isn't the problem. Confusing group-level statistics with assumptions about individuals is.
Stereotype accuracy is one of the best validated concepts in sociology. Most stereotypes are based on pattern recognition. Failure to recognise patterns or make use of Bayesian logic reduces our ability to understand problems and identify solutions.
Recognising patterns and using Bayesian reasoning are useful, but they don't make EVERY stereotype accurate. You still need reliable data, a clear definition of what you're measuring, and evidence that the pattern holds once you account for all relevant factors.
And even if a group-level difference is real, that doesn't tell you what caused it... Let alone justify treating an individual differently based on their ethnicity! That's the distinction I'm making: describing a statistical pattern is one thing = using it to explain away discrimination or justify unequal treatment is another.
I'm not arguing for denying data. I'm arguing that we shouldn't confuse observing a correlation with understanding its causes, or statistical prediction with moral justification.
Leftists never apply this logic symmetrically though. E.g. feminists will say all sorts of nasty things about men and argue that it's justified by male behavior. Or reparations will be demanded from white people on the basis of things their ancestors supposedly did.
Thank you, Tomás, for taking the time to go deeper into the details and attempt to explain the various points of view.
I would just add that the French model—which integrated immigrant communities during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—lacked adequate planning, leading to the creation of ghettos; however, this did not affect all the groups that arrived in France.
Spanish and Italian immigrants, for instance, were, on average, better integrated and less demanding during their initial settlement period, which fostered a more positive dynamic for subsequent generations.
What stands out here is how many of France’s problems seem to reinforce one another. Education, public finances and institutional trust are often discussed separately, but weaknesses in one can make the others harder to address. The challenge is not just identifying what has gone wrong, but understanding why the system struggles to correct it.
agreed... learn so much reading your pieces and the way you are able to connect things and find a deeper issue hidden in sometimes normal looking happenings.
For the post WWII West, there was an unspoken deal - work moderately hard, play by the rules that matter, and you will lead a reasonably comfortable life. Not only that, but your children will have a good shot at a better life than you had.
This largely stemmed from fear of communism. Elites had to offer a bigger slice of the pie, lest the masses decide that communism offered a better arrangement.
This unspoken deal has broken down, in France and elsewhere. Either do whatever it takes to get yourself into the Epstein Class, or be condemned to peonage. Basically, now that fear of communism has receded, the elites want to renegotiate that deal.
The end result is something like Brasil, albeit with worse weather, less attractive females, and a more hypermiltarized foreign policy. But few mosquitos. Brasil suits the Brasilian elites just dandy, BTW.
The other issue is the eternally popular nostrum of education. If we could all be sufficiently educated, our prosperity would be assured, as if a society consisting entirely of lawyers, CPAs, software developers, management consultants and the like would prosper.
Can you show me actual statistical data which substantiates your claim "Either do whatever it takes to get yourself into the Epstein Class, or be condemned to peonage. Basically, now that fear of communism has receded, the elites want to renegotiate that deal."
Because it looks to me like life for typical French people has been flat or improved since the fall of the Berlin wall. Here's another stat, median wage adjusted for cost of living, up 40% since 1990
The biggest issue in education are 2 weeks of unnecessary holidays for 6 weeks of school. Why do we need 2 weeks in fev, 2 weeks in april 2 weeks in october + numerous bridge (ponts) in mai. All this is being done for following reasons : 1.// Teacher union lobby 2.// Lobby of tourism industry 3.// This helps rich havng a monopoly on good schools (grandes écoles) for their kids because they can provide private tutors+ coaching during breaks. so everything that kids from poor areas can enjoy social mobility. Most of teachers are unionised and are mentailly socialist and they are mostly successful in imparting the same morals to kid.
I'am an outsider who came from asia but my kid is studing in middle school here, so i may hv some outsider's views that a normal French guy may find offending. so pls bear with me .. i agree that boomer class in France (and generally in other developed world) has amassed alot of wealth and are profiting from very generous pension system and it may be a problem. but atleast they earned it because their generation was reponsible for the post war period that saw maximum progress the developed world ever achieved (30 glorious in France). What has the current generation achieved apart from whinning all the time to deserve anything and dont forget they will ultimately profit from boomers generation's wealth when they die through succession and inheritance tax.
As you correctly point out, this is a sensitive issue in which any stance risks being interpreted as ideological; nevertheless, it remains unavoidable. Having resided in France for five years, I possess a modest familiarity with the country, which encourages me to offer the following observations:
First, regarding the economic dimension: France performs slightly better than Spain in the PISA assessments, despite maintaining higher educational expenditures. Perhaps the underlying issue is that French society, characterized by a structural gap arising from migration, requires a significantly higher level of investment. I concur that the primary strain stems from overly generous pension systems. While raising the retirement age to 72 appears excessive to me, the current trajectory is undeniably unsustainable.
France exhibits one of the highest levels of tax revenue and public expenditure relative to GDP within the European Union. The core question, therefore, lies in the allocation of expenditure and the structure of tax collection. The solution unlikely resides in increasing revenue extraction—which seems practically infeasible—but rather in redistributing the fiscal burden more equitably, don't you think? Across Europe, the wage share as a percentage of GDP has consistently declined, whereas the share of corporate profits has expanded. Should this structural asymmetry not also be addressed?
Regarding the demographic aspect, I contend that the fundamental error in French policy was the spatial segregation of immigrant populations into enclaves (banlieues), which has ultimately yielded the current outcomes in terms of educational attainment, economic participation, and relative crime rates. In line with your view, I believe the most prudent approach lies in a balanced perspective, avoiding both the naive discourse of systemic oppression and the indiscriminate vilification of immigrants.
However, I respectfully diverge from your interpretation of colonialism. The primary countries of origin for immigration to France are recent former colonies, markedly distinct from the historical trajectory of Spanish colonization. French colonialism was, by and large, predominantly extractive, demonstrating minimal interest in building enduring state structures or fostering social infrastructure. Consequently, former French colonies retain a sense of having been exploited, deriving little benefit beyond the adoption of the language. This lingering resentment is temporally proximate, which may explain why Latin American migration to Spain presents fewer integration challenges. In any event, a significant cultural dimension persists, stemming—in my view—from flawed integration strategies: when you note that many suburban protesters identify more strongly with their ancestors' countries of origin and with Islam than with their country of birth, it reveals a profound structural problem.
Regrettably, far-left political actors, rather than resolving these tensions, are likely to catalyze a radicalized reaction from the opposing spectrum. La France Insoumise (LFI) constitutes a harmful element in this dynamic, no less so than the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National).
Political moderation appears to have failed. I look forward to your forthcoming article, though I remain pessimistic. Perhaps reason will only prevail once the current phase of ideological extremism has run its course.
I don't agree with the colonialism. Spanish and Portuguese colonies were mostly extractive and neither Spain nor Portugal had a sizable immigration until very recently. The immigrants to France came voluntarily, they were not forced. If they hate the country, they should not go to it and live in it. A signal that the issue is not the colonial past is that the economic and criminal performance of these immigrants across Europe is the same, France is not an underperformer.
Many countries such as Ireland, Finland, Canada, Australia, Denmark etc have no history of colonialism and yet a strong desire of people to immigrate from poor countries. And the Africans and Muslims who immigrate have exactly the same pathologies as the immigrants to France. And the East Asians who immigrate there have exactly the same success as they do in France. Human capital, and in some cases, strong positive selection explain the behaviour and outcome of immigrants without the need for multiplying un-needed causes.
It's not only that "10s of thousands of people have vandalised" , it's a hard core group of - mainly ultra left and moslim - "fighters/casseurs " that use the demonstrations to wreak havoc and destroy what they hate. And obviously they quickly get a following of the usual idiots who are just there to have fun destroying and looting.
Same thing is happening in other countries and cities.
Good article though.
I am interested in Ground News but I feel that it mainly covers US and World news agencies. I don't see any press sources from my country (Belgium) and France in their list.
Thank you for this insightful analysis. I think it points to a broader pattern: economic grievances often evolve into political demands when people begin to question not just government policies, but the system’s ability to deliver on its promises.
In Europe, these tensions may eventually force a reconsideration of the EU’s political architecture. Rather than a complete breakup, we might see the emergence of a multi-speed Europe, with member states reclaiming greater autonomy over their economic and social policies.
Perhaps what we are witnessing is not merely a series of national crises, but a growing mismatch between a shared European framework and the increasingly divergent realities of the countries within it.
El análisis de Thomas es bastante exhaustivo y correcto. Lo que hecho en falta es una explicación de cómo o por qué se ha llegado hasta acá. El análisis se detiene en mostrar los límites de la escasez, las insuficiencias de determinados grupos sociales. Pero no se aborda la cuestión de fondo: por qué es así; cómo se llegó hasta este presente.
¿Quizás en las propuestas de solución se profundice en las causas de fondo?
Interesting breakdown, but looking at this from Central Europe, your diagnosis has a huge blind spot: you didn't mention the Eurozone or the European Central Bank once.
You treat France like a closed island where people just decided to be lazy and pamper retirees, and you conclude the government can "rebalance its budget overnight" by raising the retirement age and cutting student perks. But that ignores how the plumbing actually works.
First, that headline figure of France spending ~57% of GDP on public expenditure is misleading. People assume that money goes into classrooms, clinics, and trains. It doesn't. Over the last decade, the French state turned into a giant pass-through: over €150 billion a year goes straight into private-sector subsidies and tax exemptions for large corporations (aides aux entreprises), while debt interest paid to private bondholders eats over €60 billion annually. The state isn't running out of cash because of €1 cafeteria lunches; it’s siphoning public funds upward.
Second, France gave up its monetary sovereignty decades ago. It can’t devalue, and the central bank cannot backstop its treasury. Because Paris is locked into the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact deficit limits, something has to give. Bond interest is legally untouchable, military spending is climbing, and corporate subsidies are defended to prevent capital flight. That leaves schools, universities, and hospitals as the only flexible line items the government can squeeze to hit EU targets. That's why real spending per student dropped roughly 20% since 2017 while private wealth in France doubled.
When you spend half the article on suburban looters, €1 lunches, and ethnic demographics, you're looking at the noise at the bottom of the funnel. The barricades aren't burning because French teenagers are uniquely coddled. They burn because the public sphere is being structurally hollowed out to service an external fiscal cage.
More on this:
https://darkomulej.substack.com/p/france-the-myth-of-the-broke-state
Hi Darko, thanks for this.
Yes indeed.
Lots of other countries in Europe have a similar problem, yet don't get the same riots. WHich is why I discuss pensions (France is the most egregious), but don't only focus on pensions.
If you zoom in on public *social* spending (health, old age, incapacity-related benefits, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment, housing, etc.), France is still one of the biggest spenders in the OECD (along with Austria and Finland):
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/social-spending-oecd-longrun?tab=map
Fair point, France does spend a lot on social protection. That model worked while borrowing was cheap and growth was ok. Now France can’t devalue, the ECB isn’t going to backstop it, and the deficit rules leave little room. On top of that you have a growing defence and Ukraine bill and oil back above $100 because of the Iran war. Yields at a 24 year high show the markets see all of it hitting at once.
And the burden isn’t spread evenly. Most French retirees own their home, and the young mostly don’t and can’t afford to. So the old keep their pensions and their property, and the young pay the rent and the taxes. I think that’s a big part of why they are the ones on the street.
Tomas is right that others have similar problems without the riots (OK, they have protest, but not so fierce). But France has the squeeze, the stuck parliament and this generational gap all at once.
No matter how much anyone has if they start having less they will be less happy than people who always had less but are getting more. Unfortunately very little can infinitely increase.
The loss of monetary sovereignty is a hugely underappreciated flaw in the EU single currency—and the European Union's greatest structural weakness.
Agreed. A shared currency without shared fiscal backing leaves countries with no devaluation and no real lender of last resort, and a crisis exposes that.
And when help does come, it has strings.*
*Italy’s Covid recovery money (about €194bn) is paid in instalments, only when Rome hits agreed milestones. Those include competition laws that make tenders the default for concessions, and make municipalities justify keeping local services in-house. Private clinics also got easier accreditation into the public health system, and taxi licensing was pushed to open up. Beach concessions (balneari) have to go to open tender by 2027 too.
I'd argue that's actually good. Italy is prone to bad laws for competition, because some people can capture parts of the economy. These liberalizations are good for all.
I do read your articles with great interest, and it is the first time I see myself disagreeing with you.
1- Saying that every euro country is in the same shitty situation but french are the only one to unrest, which is caused by entitlement issue is strange to me.
The others SHOULD unrest. When you cite 700k people studying in bad conditions in UK but "they never protest" , is not a great look.
Yes they should protest because everyone has the right to study in good conditions.
It's like saying in 18th century protesting for democracy and freedom is strange because everyone else lives in royalist and authoritarian régime.
2- you missed the point on police brutality , and I was shocked that you lower the bar of police violence by comparing it to Iranian police.
When the police Hurst it's citizen it is not OK.
Watch .au nom du maintien de l'ordre.
https://youtu.be/0lwosqymlcg?is=T3LQFpuxrFp8HIlt
documentary , you will see that most often than not, rioters are caused by the police gassing people when there is NO violence in the first place.
3- you say that LFI (not extreme left as per the conseil d'etat ruling) is running this in the background but yet offer few evidence to support that claim. Even prosecutors said that people arrested were not necessarily from extreme left , and renseignements généraux did not say that LFI was coordinating the movement.
Here's my take , I look forward to hear from you
It’s France, this has happened like every eighteen months since 1789.
That's not the first time they protested, it's the first time they prevailed.
Your analysis identifies many of France's immediate problems, but I believe the riots are symptoms of something far more consequential: decades of political decisions that have produced an unsustainable economic and social model. France's challenge is not a lack of resources, talent, or opportunity. It is a political system that seems incapable of reconciling its promises with any sort economic reality. If that remains static, it is a non-starter for correcting any part of the problems France and much of Europe have built into their political systems.
France remains an extraordinary country with enormous intellectual, industrial, and technological strengths. Yet its government has created expectations that economic growth and public finances can no longer comfortably support.
Pension reform is unavoidable, although simply raising the retirement age without considering differences in life expectancy, occupational demands, and individual circumstances is hardly equitable. Gradual adjustments, incentives to remain employed, reduced regulatory burdens, and policies encouraging entrepreneurship would offer a more sustainable approach.
Wealth must be created before it can be redistributed.
Education presents another challenge. Spending on more administrators, not teachers, means little without measurable improvement. Look at the percentage of admin/teachers and adjust accordingly. Create a teacher/administrator percentage that is codified. Stronger academic standards, vocational opportunities, and closer relationships between schools and employers could substantially improve economic mobility. Use company expertise in areas that can create jobs and apprenticesships.
Immigration, however, may represent France's most complicated long-term challenge—not necessarily because of immigration itself, but because of failures in integration that most of Europe has lost the concept of integration instead of just adding people who bring their culture with them, and they remain outside any acculturation. This has created the most division and until countries in Europe change, they will not solve any of the overiding issues that are a result of this cultural divide.
Countries such as America, Canada, and Australia demonstrate immigration's enormous potential when newcomers have opportunities to participate economically and socially. France's circumstances differ, including its colonial history, established immigrant communities, and distinct secular traditions. These differences matter and they are a poor starting point for France and Europe in general.
Economic immigration policies should emphasize skills, language proficiency, and employment potential, while respecting humanitarian responsibilities. Equally important, France must address the concentrated poverty, inadequate educational opportunities, and unemployment that have left many immigrant families feeling excluded from French society.
Second- and third-generation immigrants are French citizens, not newcomers awaiting acceptance. Their ability to participate fully in French economic and civic life is essential. Integration requires responsibilities from individuals, but also genuine opportunities provided by society.
Religious freedom and cultural identity deserve protection, but neither should supersede French law or fundamental democratic principles. A shared national identity need not require abandoning one's heritage. It works, but only if it is aFeance first, cultural identity second.
Illegal immigration should be high on the list for the government, but it should also be consistent and humane enforcement, with appropriate removal procedures and deportation of serious criminal offenders quickly, but within what the law requires.
As for the riots, even legitimate grievances never justify violence. Destroying schools, businesses, and public infrastructure ultimately harms the very communities that need improvement. Accountability must apply equally to violent offenders and police misconduct.
Artificial intelligence offers France a remarkable opportunity to modernize government, improve education, and increase productivity. Whether political leadership embraces that opportunity is unlikely, but it should be the rallying cry of all French citizens.
With all that said, France's greatest obstacle may be neither immigration nor economic inequality, but political paralysis. Meaningful reform requires confronting entrenched interests, acknowledging uncomfortable realities, and recognizing that preserving every existing arrangement is no longer possible.
The riots may capture the headlines, but France's inability to reform may prove far more damaging than the riots themselves.
I agree with a lot of this! Thanks!
Most of what you propose is common sense reforms. I don't think the problem is these solutions are unknown. Instead, it looks like what's going on is structural political gridlock and entrenched ideological pathology. That hard working, peaceful, and successful Asian immigrant are vilified tells the whole story.
I find it astonishing that in your analysis there was no section discussing French colonialism among the root causes. It's not by accident that there are so many immigrants, 1st and 2nd generation in France from the former French colonies. By the way, I am an American, born in U.S.A., was a university student in France in the early 60's, am well versed in French history, fluent in French and have remained in contact with friends there, History does play a role in the ongoing social, economic, and political problems in France. Comparing to Canada is simplistic.
Hi Theresa, thanks for writuing.
Spain had 500 years of colonialism, yet until the 1990s barely any Latin American immigrant (or any immigration for that matter). Same for Portugal.
This shows that immigration is not the consequence of colonialism.
The immigrants that went into France did so not because they had been oppressed by France, but because France offered them opportunities and welfare.
When you're Algerian and you want to escape your country, the your best bet is France, which is much richer, much closer than alternatives, and speaks French like most Algerians do.
So no, I don't think colonization has a role here, but maybe I'm missing it?
I think the main link is the language. If not for colonialism, there wouldn't be a shared language.
Which means colonialism was net good for these people, as it gave them an opportunity to go to France which would have otherwise been much harder
Well, the immigration opportunities due to a shared language language goes in the pros column of colonialism for them, but that doesn't conclude the question of whether the pros or cons column comes out ahead on net.
Unlike Spanish colonized peoples, who had to cross the Atlantic Ocean, French colonized peoples only needed to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, during WWI and WWII, the French government promised citizenship to volunteers from its colonies who fought for France.
Yes. I believe the current people causing the most problems are not mainly the descendants of the fighters.
Colonialism was bad. But how is that a root cause of the current riots?
I've been interested in your writing since the beginning but sometimes I wonder about the depth. Here, for instance, I wonder why you insert the video about the kids being apparently hysterical in only wanting to break, without any reason (after "violence against public officials, and incitement to unlawful assembly."). It is weird in the text at that moment. And then ... the video is probably doctored, starting in France Place de La Republique, but then finishing in another country (the building in the end is not in Paris, and there is Bolt bicycle in the stack, hence NOT PARIS). I suspect the kid talking is NOT IN PARIS.
Thomas: except if you goal is ideological, such carelessness is irresponsible.
There is some wisdom in the rest of the letter, but please, please please, can your source info not only by truthfullness and by representativeness ???
Your call...
Hi Fabrice, thank you for your take. Let me help here.
Although the demonstrations started in Paris, they spread through the country. That's why it's titled Why France Is in Chaos. The article covers it all, which means the video might start in Paris, but then covers Limoges (where the city hall burned), Lyon (where the tourism office burnt), Marseille (where people stormed an official building), etc. The very fist video, at the top of the article, says in the middle "Marseille".
I added Belgium because something very informative happened there: It's a different country than France, so the same system doesn't apply, and hence the student complaints can't be the same either. Yet the riots spread there too.
But only on the French side of Belgium, not the Dutch-speaking Flanders. I think that's crucial in showing a mechanism by which the riots spread: Not because of the demands, but because of the language. This was social and cultural spread.
Unfortunately, I had a small paragraph explaining this in a caption but it got lost when I ported it to publication. I have now updated it back in. So thanks for that.
Indeed, the Walloon region of Belgium is very connected to what happens in France. It is also economically , linguistically and culturally more or less connected to the French - Walloon has a lot of debts and is fed from the Flanders treasury . They also share a common ancestry with the French going back to the Roman Gaul. The Flanders region of Belgium has had no demonstrations concerning these topics at this time as far as I know . And Brussels - as someone in the US once said - is a real hellhole as far as some parts ( Schaarbeek , Molenbeek , .. ) are concerned.
Furthermore, Walloon and Brussels region are more left-wing (Partie Socialiste) then the Flemings.
Thanks for your reply.
I wrote a whole book about France, hence I'm pretty curious about people write about it... (« Oui ! la France est un paradis pour entrepreneurs » (Plon 2016)). So "why France in chaos" primed me on a France analysis...
I like many of your analyses and love your bent into visualization.
However, as a professional social scientist, I'm often puzzled about the boundaries of your thinking process, when it edges into "crypto-boy territory" ;) I hope you take it with a grain of salt ;)
Thanks for this interaction anyway, and congrats for your work,
Best,
Understandable, I’m glad you caught it!
What does crypto-boy mean, and why do you think it applies?
I’m not asking to push back on the label, but rather to understand the psychology behind using it!
What video are you referring to exactly? The one at the top of the article? Or the 'Tout casser " video that was shot in Brussels or Liege (Belgium) or yet another?
the one after the sentence (search for it): "... violence against public officials, and incitement to unlawful assembly."
I suspect this is BXL indeed, including when the kid taks, the concrete in the background is more BXL than Place de la République, Paris, France...
It certainly is in Belgium. The name on the board is that of Valérie Glatigny (ministre de l'Enseignement obligatoire en Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles).
Yes, so now I'm confused because that video is really designed to confuse viewer, trying to make believe that "place de la republic" riots is related to such statements. And why is Pueyo using it there, a video deliberating confusing location in a post talking about FRANCE, by someone who is suposed to be geographer. I'm disappointed.
The thorought analysis is really great!
To show how interesting and different the world and different societies are I want to give a perspective from the North-Eastern Europe. In Estonia, the Baltics, Finland, Norway or Denmark riots like this would never happen. Just no.
Here is a perspective from Estonia, where children can go to school on their own on foot or by public transport from age 7, and where we don't understand why so many US movies are about safety of your children and family. Here in Estonia safety just is. One example on how safety is achieved is the following. Here is a news about police taking into custody illegal immigrants (sent by Belarus) from a tip by a local resident. https://news.err.ee/1610163868/police-detain-10-illegal-immigrants-in-tallinn-s-nomme-district
Imagine in France if the police would ask the pulic to report on "suspicious immigrant looking people" and actually then catching the illigal immigrants and sending them back. :-)
When I was a child in the US I walked back from school on foot with my brother. Movies are movies: they need some sort of dramatic conflict to be interesting.
Thanks for sharing, this is awsome
Your article’s framing is quite troubling.
You acknowledge that racial discrimination exists... then argue that it “reflects reality” because certain immigrant groups supposedly commit more crime and contribute less economically.
That’s quite a leap 😅
You even cite evidence that socioeconomic status explains a lot of the differences in school behaviour, YET you keep coming back to ethnicity as an explanation. You mention poverty, discrimination, and segregation... but ultimately seem to blame the communities affected by them!
Of course, we can condemn riots, talk about crime and debate immigration policy... But there’s a difference between discussing statistics and using them to paint ENTIRE ethnic groups as less productive or more criminal.
What bothers me most is that you present this article as a data-driven analysis... when so many of the conclusions go beyond what the data actually shows!
Acknowledging that discrimination exists and then arguing that it’s justified by the behaviour of the group being discriminated against is a VERY troubling contradiction.
Thanks Milo. Maybe this will help.
Two things can be true at once.
Imagine the baseline crime rate is 0.1%, but a minority is 50x more likely to commit crime.
That means the crime rate of that minority is 5%.
It means that a standard citizen, when walking on the streets, should be 50x more fearful to be attacked by the minority than by the majority, since coming across the minority is 50x riskier.
However, it also means that 95% of the minority is law-abiding citizens. So the fact that people are scared of the 5% is unfair to the 95%.
How do we solve this?
The first thing is not to deny that there is a 5% crime rate in the minority, because that's a reality that everybody can witness, and they will be angry that it doesn't get addressed. They will especially be angry at those who hide it, because they prevent the problem from being solved.
But also, as that is done, work needs to be done to acknowledge discrimination and reduce it, so that the 95% doesn't pay for the 5%.
Which is why it's actually very important that the 95% denounces the 5%: That way they get both the reduction in crime from the minority and the signaling that they are on the side of the law, and not on that of the ethnicity.
I wrote an entire article on this:
https://unchartedterritories.tomaspueyo.com/p/islamismophobia
In data analysis, you need to make decision based on imperfect information. That's the key. You never have 100% confidence on anything. You get it as high as you can, and then make a decision.
So tell me, which of the conclusions specifically are you concerned about, that you think the data doesn't support?
I agree that two things can be true at once. I'm not arguing that we should ignore uncomfortable statistics.
But your hypothetical assumes precisely what needs to be demonstrated: that a minority is 50 times more likely to commit crime. More importantly, relative risk alone doesn't tell us how much danger an individual poses. We need to look at absolute rates, the type of crime, the population being compared, and the factors that might explain the difference.
My concern with your article is more specific than that, though. You write that discrimination against Maghrebis “reflects reality” because immigrants from certain backgrounds supposedly commit more crime and contribute less economically. Yet your own analysis of school behaviour finds that socioeconomic status predicts problems better than immigrant share, and that controlling for socioeconomic status reduces the correlation substantially, sometimes to almost zero.
You acknowledge poverty, segregation and discrimination as part of a vicious cycle, but then return to ethnicity and “lower human capital from some specific countries and ethnicities” as an explanation. That conclusion requires more evidence than correlations between immigrant share, school behaviour, crime and economic outcomes. It also requires distinguishing ethnicity from nationality, immigration status, socioeconomic circumstances and other potentially relevant factors.
The fact that most members of a group are law-abiding doesn't settle the question. I'm not disputing that disparities may exist - I'm questioning whether your data establishes WHY they exist and whether it justifies the conclusions you draw from them.
A statistical difference is a starting point for investigation, NOT proof of its own explanation.
So, to answer your question directly, I'm particularly concerned about your conclusion that discrimination “reflects reality,” your claim that immigrants from certain ethnic backgrounds have lower human capital, and your suggestion that resident immigrants who commit these crimes should immediately lose their status and be deported.
I'd like to see the evidence supporting each of them, rather than treating observed disparities as proof of their underlying cause.
It is not just the many times higher involvement in crime (on average) by some ethnic groups that cause problems it is also the very different and generally hostile and unpleasant attitudes of some immigrants that cause problems for natives.
We know from extensive studies in Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK and other countries that on average and collectively Muslims and Arabs take much more from the state than they contribute. So we lose on every sale, but make up for it on the volume?
Over-controlling is rightly called the Sociologist's fallacy. Low human capital (cognitive ability, executive function, time preference etc) is much more common in Africans and Muslims. Low human capital is to some extent genetic. Parents with low human capital will have low socioeconomic status. If you control away SES you control away the cause you are looking at.
Thought experiment. 90% of Bomalians have IQ <85 and crime involvement 10 times that of natives and a lower socioeconomic status. The 10% who have IQ >85 and crime involvement comparable to natives have comparable socioeconomic status. Controlling for socio-economic status Bomalians have the same educational achievement and incarceration % as natives.
Ergo Bomalians poor school achievement is duet to socio-economis status we should not discriminate against Bomalians and should allow infinity immigration from Bomalia and massive re-distribution from natives until all the Bomalians have the same educational outcomes as natives.
I'd like to see the actual evidence for everything you just said.
Which studies establish that Muslims and Arabs, as groups, are net fiscal burdens across these countries? Fiscal contributions vary with age, employment, education, and migration status, so I'd want to see how those factors were accounted for.
What evidence establishes that differences in crime or socioeconomic outcomes are GENETIC? Showing that a group has a lower average score or a different outcome doesn't establish why. Heritability within a population doesn't prove that differences between populations have a genetic cause.
Your Somali example doesn't demonstrate your argument either. You've built a hypothetical around specific numbers without providing a source for them, then used it to draw conclusions about genetics and policy. That's not evidence = it's an illustration based on assumptions you've chosen!
I'm not arguing that group differences should be ignored. I'm asking you to distinguish between measured disparities, explanations for those disparities, and the policy conclusions you draw from them. Those are three different things, and evidence for one doesn't automatically establish the others.
Tomas, I understand and agree with your take on immigrant crime.
I think the rhetoric around this issue is skewed by Americentrism. In America, immigrants commit fewer crimes than natives. It's the opposite in Europe. We should be able to talk about different situations differently. https://www.theargumentmag.com/p/why-america-is-so-much-better-than
Despite broadly agreeing with you on this issue, I too was a bit bothered by the fact that you left it at this in your essay:
1. There is discrimination.
2. The discrimination "reflects reality," because of higher relative rates of crime.
I factually agree with those, but would have liked to see something more nuanced, such as by adding:
3. The discrimination feels bad and results in unfair treatment, because of low absolute rates of crime.
Relative vs. absolute is a big distinction that cuts in both ways. To use the numbers from your thought experiment above, say a group commits crimes at a base rate of 5%. It would be unfortunate and unjust if this meant nobody would hire members of that group for jobs or admit them to universities. I think it would be reasonable to be upset about that discrimination (and hopefully to express it in a more effective way than these riots).
I think one way of defining "stereotyping" is: inaccurately extrapolating high relative rates to high absolute rates. I think a society invested in justice - and especially one invested in liberal individualism rather than identity politics - has an interest in fighting against this inaccurate tendency. That means we need to be conscious of bias and not discriminate more than absolute rates justify. This is especially true in areas like employment, education, housing, etc., because being unfairly excluded from those can cause major disadvantages.
He actually takes care to mention that most Maghrebi and Africans do OK and trouble is caused by a minority of criminals.
As for the possibility that some groups on average do better than other, that is something that must be considered if effective policy is to be made, though painful for some and, granted, a dangerous slope also - though denial is perhaps the straightest path to really dangerous discrimination.
You can say “it's only a minority” while still reinforcing stereotypes about entire ethnic groups.
I'm not saying that group differences should never be studied or that policy should ignore evidence. I'm arguing that correlation doesn't establish causation, and that socioeconomic factors, segregation, and discrimination matter (A LOT!) when interpreting these statistics. The article itself presents evidence that socioeconomic status explains a substantial part of the differences in school behaviour.
Of course, we need evidence-based policy. But there's a difference between using data to understand WHY certain problems occur and using group-level statistics to portray particular ethnicities as more criminal or less productive. The former can help address problems, while the latter risks reinforcing the very discrimination we're trying to understand!
And denial isn't the only alternative to accepting the author's conclusions. We can examine uncomfortable data critically without jumping to ethnic generalizations.
Some people will always hate difference, that is not a reason to pretend it doesn't exist.
Like, an overwhelming majority of violent crime is done by one group: males aged 12-30. Fortunately we can say that without some getting all worked up and make policy and police action accordingly. Yes some women will claim that that's proof that men are evil but they're safely ignored, and you can do the same with the people that will pretend that all Africans are bad because some of them are criminals.
There's a difference between acknowledging statistical differences between groups and using those statistics to justify generalisations about individuals.
If the data show that young men are disproportionately responsible for certain violent crimes, we can acknowledge that and use it to inform policy. But that doesn't mean men as a group are evil, or that any individual man should be treated as dangerous.
The same logic applies to any other demographic group. You can discuss reliable statistics about specific populations and specific outcomes without concluding that those populations are inherently bad. The question is what the data actually demonstrates, and whether the conclusions drawn from it are justified.
Acknowledging differences isn't the problem. Confusing group-level statistics with assumptions about individuals is.
Stereotype accuracy is one of the best validated concepts in sociology. Most stereotypes are based on pattern recognition. Failure to recognise patterns or make use of Bayesian logic reduces our ability to understand problems and identify solutions.
Recognising patterns and using Bayesian reasoning are useful, but they don't make EVERY stereotype accurate. You still need reliable data, a clear definition of what you're measuring, and evidence that the pattern holds once you account for all relevant factors.
And even if a group-level difference is real, that doesn't tell you what caused it... Let alone justify treating an individual differently based on their ethnicity! That's the distinction I'm making: describing a statistical pattern is one thing = using it to explain away discrimination or justify unequal treatment is another.
I'm not arguing for denying data. I'm arguing that we shouldn't confuse observing a correlation with understanding its causes, or statistical prediction with moral justification.
Leftists never apply this logic symmetrically though. E.g. feminists will say all sorts of nasty things about men and argue that it's justified by male behavior. Or reparations will be demanded from white people on the basis of things their ancestors supposedly did.
Thank you, Tomás, for taking the time to go deeper into the details and attempt to explain the various points of view.
I would just add that the French model—which integrated immigrant communities during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—lacked adequate planning, leading to the creation of ghettos; however, this did not affect all the groups that arrived in France.
Spanish and Italian immigrants, for instance, were, on average, better integrated and less demanding during their initial settlement period, which fostered a more positive dynamic for subsequent generations.
Is that because of policy, or because of human capital?
Human capital, understood as a mix of education, culture, principles, and values, including religion and believes.
What stands out here is how many of France’s problems seem to reinforce one another. Education, public finances and institutional trust are often discussed separately, but weaknesses in one can make the others harder to address. The challenge is not just identifying what has gone wrong, but understanding why the system struggles to correct it.
Which is why you need interdisciplinary analysis! What we specialize on here. Thanks!
agreed... learn so much reading your pieces and the way you are able to connect things and find a deeper issue hidden in sometimes normal looking happenings.
For the post WWII West, there was an unspoken deal - work moderately hard, play by the rules that matter, and you will lead a reasonably comfortable life. Not only that, but your children will have a good shot at a better life than you had.
This largely stemmed from fear of communism. Elites had to offer a bigger slice of the pie, lest the masses decide that communism offered a better arrangement.
This unspoken deal has broken down, in France and elsewhere. Either do whatever it takes to get yourself into the Epstein Class, or be condemned to peonage. Basically, now that fear of communism has receded, the elites want to renegotiate that deal.
The end result is something like Brasil, albeit with worse weather, less attractive females, and a more hypermiltarized foreign policy. But few mosquitos. Brasil suits the Brasilian elites just dandy, BTW.
The other issue is the eternally popular nostrum of education. If we could all be sufficiently educated, our prosperity would be assured, as if a society consisting entirely of lawyers, CPAs, software developers, management consultants and the like would prosper.
Hmmm France taxes a higher share of income than the USSR. It's closer to Communism than the Capitalism that the US proposed 60y ago.
The massive taxes make it a very equal society—unlike Brazil.
And part of the taxes are used in the commons, making urbanism way more beautiful in France than Brazil.
So I don't agree at all! But thanks for disagreeing.
The Soviet Union had little use for income tax because all business was owned by the state. Strange comparison you chose.
Ever been to a banlieu? Hardly an example of beautiful urbanism.
Your theory would seem to predict that French poverty has increased since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But the opposite appears to be true:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/poverty-share-on-less-than-30-per-day?tab=line&country=~FRA&mapSelect=~FRA
Side note, there's SO MUCH internet slop which can be easily refuted with a quick trip to OWID
I'm not sure what your graph is trying to show, but, no, 60% of french people were not living in poverty in 1970.
$30 a day is a relatively high threshold for poverty. By this definition, 74% of Russia is currently in poverty for example
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/poverty-share-on-less-than-30-per-day
Can you show me actual statistical data which substantiates your claim "Either do whatever it takes to get yourself into the Epstein Class, or be condemned to peonage. Basically, now that fear of communism has receded, the elites want to renegotiate that deal."
Because it looks to me like life for typical French people has been flat or improved since the fall of the Berlin wall. Here's another stat, median wage adjusted for cost of living, up 40% since 1990
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incomes-across-distribution-wb?tab=line&country=%7EFRA&mapSelect=%7EFRA&indicator=median&decile=nan&period=day&survey_comparability=no_spells
Don't believe everything you read online. People love to complain even when it's unjustified.
I'm not sure where these stats are coming from, but median income in franc3me was not $40 a day in 1990.
The biggest issue in education are 2 weeks of unnecessary holidays for 6 weeks of school. Why do we need 2 weeks in fev, 2 weeks in april 2 weeks in october + numerous bridge (ponts) in mai. All this is being done for following reasons : 1.// Teacher union lobby 2.// Lobby of tourism industry 3.// This helps rich havng a monopoly on good schools (grandes écoles) for their kids because they can provide private tutors+ coaching during breaks. so everything that kids from poor areas can enjoy social mobility. Most of teachers are unionised and are mentailly socialist and they are mostly successful in imparting the same morals to kid.
I recently heard bill maer say something great: “ the young want socialism, because they’re jealous that the older people have it and they don’t. ”
I'am an outsider who came from asia but my kid is studing in middle school here, so i may hv some outsider's views that a normal French guy may find offending. so pls bear with me .. i agree that boomer class in France (and generally in other developed world) has amassed alot of wealth and are profiting from very generous pension system and it may be a problem. but atleast they earned it because their generation was reponsible for the post war period that saw maximum progress the developed world ever achieved (30 glorious in France). What has the current generation achieved apart from whinning all the time to deserve anything and dont forget they will ultimately profit from boomers generation's wealth when they die through succession and inheritance tax.
Hello Tomás,
As you correctly point out, this is a sensitive issue in which any stance risks being interpreted as ideological; nevertheless, it remains unavoidable. Having resided in France for five years, I possess a modest familiarity with the country, which encourages me to offer the following observations:
First, regarding the economic dimension: France performs slightly better than Spain in the PISA assessments, despite maintaining higher educational expenditures. Perhaps the underlying issue is that French society, characterized by a structural gap arising from migration, requires a significantly higher level of investment. I concur that the primary strain stems from overly generous pension systems. While raising the retirement age to 72 appears excessive to me, the current trajectory is undeniably unsustainable.
France exhibits one of the highest levels of tax revenue and public expenditure relative to GDP within the European Union. The core question, therefore, lies in the allocation of expenditure and the structure of tax collection. The solution unlikely resides in increasing revenue extraction—which seems practically infeasible—but rather in redistributing the fiscal burden more equitably, don't you think? Across Europe, the wage share as a percentage of GDP has consistently declined, whereas the share of corporate profits has expanded. Should this structural asymmetry not also be addressed?
Regarding the demographic aspect, I contend that the fundamental error in French policy was the spatial segregation of immigrant populations into enclaves (banlieues), which has ultimately yielded the current outcomes in terms of educational attainment, economic participation, and relative crime rates. In line with your view, I believe the most prudent approach lies in a balanced perspective, avoiding both the naive discourse of systemic oppression and the indiscriminate vilification of immigrants.
However, I respectfully diverge from your interpretation of colonialism. The primary countries of origin for immigration to France are recent former colonies, markedly distinct from the historical trajectory of Spanish colonization. French colonialism was, by and large, predominantly extractive, demonstrating minimal interest in building enduring state structures or fostering social infrastructure. Consequently, former French colonies retain a sense of having been exploited, deriving little benefit beyond the adoption of the language. This lingering resentment is temporally proximate, which may explain why Latin American migration to Spain presents fewer integration challenges. In any event, a significant cultural dimension persists, stemming—in my view—from flawed integration strategies: when you note that many suburban protesters identify more strongly with their ancestors' countries of origin and with Islam than with their country of birth, it reveals a profound structural problem.
Regrettably, far-left political actors, rather than resolving these tensions, are likely to catalyze a radicalized reaction from the opposing spectrum. La France Insoumise (LFI) constitutes a harmful element in this dynamic, no less so than the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National).
Political moderation appears to have failed. I look forward to your forthcoming article, though I remain pessimistic. Perhaps reason will only prevail once the current phase of ideological extremism has run its course.
Thanks, I agree with most of what you say!
I don't agree with the colonialism. Spanish and Portuguese colonies were mostly extractive and neither Spain nor Portugal had a sizable immigration until very recently. The immigrants to France came voluntarily, they were not forced. If they hate the country, they should not go to it and live in it. A signal that the issue is not the colonial past is that the economic and criminal performance of these immigrants across Europe is the same, France is not an underperformer.
Many countries such as Ireland, Finland, Canada, Australia, Denmark etc have no history of colonialism and yet a strong desire of people to immigrate from poor countries. And the Africans and Muslims who immigrate have exactly the same pathologies as the immigrants to France. And the East Asians who immigrate there have exactly the same success as they do in France. Human capital, and in some cases, strong positive selection explain the behaviour and outcome of immigrants without the need for multiplying un-needed causes.
Anda why is that? Couldn't it be that the resentment of recent colonialism is stronger in those populations than in the Latin American people?
What's the reason behind your alleged “poor human capital” (just curious, not arguing)?
It's not only that "10s of thousands of people have vandalised" , it's a hard core group of - mainly ultra left and moslim - "fighters/casseurs " that use the demonstrations to wreak havoc and destroy what they hate. And obviously they quickly get a following of the usual idiots who are just there to have fun destroying and looting.
Same thing is happening in other countries and cities.
Good article though.
I am interested in Ground News but I feel that it mainly covers US and World news agencies. I don't see any press sources from my country (Belgium) and France in their list.
I'll make sure to share that feedback with them!
Thank you for this insightful analysis. I think it points to a broader pattern: economic grievances often evolve into political demands when people begin to question not just government policies, but the system’s ability to deliver on its promises.
In Europe, these tensions may eventually force a reconsideration of the EU’s political architecture. Rather than a complete breakup, we might see the emergence of a multi-speed Europe, with member states reclaiming greater autonomy over their economic and social policies.
Perhaps what we are witnessing is not merely a series of national crises, but a growing mismatch between a shared European framework and the increasingly divergent realities of the countries within it.
El análisis de Thomas es bastante exhaustivo y correcto. Lo que hecho en falta es una explicación de cómo o por qué se ha llegado hasta acá. El análisis se detiene en mostrar los límites de la escasez, las insuficiencias de determinados grupos sociales. Pero no se aborda la cuestión de fondo: por qué es así; cómo se llegó hasta este presente.
¿Quizás en las propuestas de solución se profundice en las causas de fondo?
Veremos.
Oido!
Voici un article, plutôt bien fait, qui étudie les mêmes événements :
https://lel.media/17-octobre-qui-veut-la-peau-de-la-presidentielle/
Ah, interessant. D'autres points assex differents. Merci!